STACK
ANNEX
5
033
855

What Shall We Say?

Being comments on current matters of

WAR and WASTE

A
000 086 263
1
UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

By
DAVID STARR JORDAN

California
Regional
Facility

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
Boston, Massachusetts, U. S. A.
1913

What Shall We Say?

Being comments on current matters of

WAR and WASTE

PT 22 april/50

By

DAVID STARR JORDAN

"Bloody the hue Ciatalgia's bivouacs lend
Unto the waning star of Bethlehem."
—*M. B. Anderson*

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
Boston, Massachusetts, U. S. A.
1913

Copyright, 1913,
by
DAVID STARR JORDAN

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

To the memory of

Sir Charles Bagot

and of

Richard Rush

patriots of a hundred years ago, who excluded warships from the Great Lakes of America and thus secured what no warrior could—lasting peace between two great nations. Where there are no soldiers there is no war.

1703780

PREFATORY NOTE

These little essays were originally written and sent out as personal comments or "editorials" to friends interested in the fight against war and war accessories.

Two of these — numbers 1 and 6 — were originally published in the *Atlantic Monthly*, number 21 in the *Independent*, and parts of numbers 24 and 28 in the *World's Work*. Others have been copied in various journals at home and abroad.

Stanford University, California,
January 19, 1913.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. Peace and the Balkans	9
2. Shall the Turk Go?	11
3. Why Turkey Fails	13
4. The Fate of Armenia	15
5. The Great War of Europe	18
6. "Our Ships" and Our Money	22
7. The Open Door at Panama	24
8. Which Ship Goes First	25
9. Twenty-five Thousand at Panama	26
10. The Canal and its Enemies	28
11. The Size of the Navy	30
12. The Monroe Doctrine	32
13. Military Conscription	35
14. The Abolition of Piracy	38
15. Entangling Alliances	40
16. The Pest of Glory	42
17. The Force of Arms	45
18. The Fighting Edge	47
19. The Net of the Usurer	50
20. The Fertile Dreadnaught	52
21. The Dream of Invasion	54
22. The Defense of the Pacific	57
23. Pearl Harbor	61
24. Magdalena Bay	64
25. The Samoan Precedent	68
26. Japanese Immigration	69
27. The Old-Age Pension	71
28. Taxing the Cost of Living	74
29. Fort Graft	79
30. The Navy and Statesmanship	80

I.

Peace and the Balkans

What shall we say, as lovers of peace, in face of the Balkan war? Is it true that while Serbs are Serbs and Greeks are Greeks, and Turks are Turks, there is no way out save war? Is it not true that while Turks rule aliens for the money to be extorted, there can be no peace between them and their subjects or their neighbors?

It is not necessary for us to answer these questions. They belong to history rather than to morals. The progress of events will take our answer from our lips. The problem comes to us too late for any act of ours to be effective. The stage was set, the actors chosen, thirty-four years ago, at Berlin in 1878. Our part is to strive for peace—first, to do away with causes for war; second, to lead people to look for war as *the last and not the first* remedy for national wrongs or national disagreements. Most wars have their origin in the evil passions of men, and no war could take place if both sides were sincerely desirous of honorable peace.

No doubt, the Balkan situation could have been controlled for peace by the "concert of powers" in Europe, were it not that no such concert exists. The instruments are out of tune and time. So long as foreign offices are alike controlled by the interests of great exploiting and competing corporations, they can never stand for good morals and good order. If they could, the Turkish rule of violence would have ceased long ago.

Those who fight against war cannot expect to do away with it in a year or a century, especially when it is urged on by five hundred years of crime and discord. The roots of the Balkan struggle lie back in the middle ages, and along mediæval lines the fight is likely to be conducted. "The right to rule, without the duty to protect," is the bane of all Oriental imperialism. Meanwhile our own task is to help to modernize the life of the world; to raise, through democracy, the estimate of the value of

men's lives; to continue through our day the enduring revolt of civilization against "obsolete forms of servitude, tyranny and waste."

The immediate purpose of the Peace Movement is, through public opinion and through international law, to exalt order above violence and to take war out of the foreground of the "international mind" in the event of disputes between races and nations. No movement forward can succeed all at once. Evil habit and false education have left the idea of war and glory too deeply ingrained. Men law-abiding and patient, willing to hear both sides, have never yet been in the majority. Yet their influence steadily grows in weight. The influence of science and arts, of international fellowship, of common business interests—small business as well as great—are leading the people of the world to better and better understanding. Left alone, civilized peoples would never make war. They have no outside grievances they wish to submit to the arbitrament of wholesale murder. To make them prepare for war they must be scared, not led. No soldier, we are told by experts, not even the fiercest Cossack, wants to fight, after he has once tried it. Those who make war never go to the front. Were it not for the exaggeration by interested parties of trade jealousies and diplomatic intrigues, few peoples would ever think of going to war. The workingmen of Europe suffer from tax-exhaustion. The fear of war is kept before them to divert them from their own sad plight. This diversion leaves their plight still the sadder.

The bread-riot, in all its phases, is the sign of over-taxation, of governmental disregard of the lives and earnings of the common man. Anarchism is the expression the idle and reckless give to the feelings of those who are still law abiding.

The Peace Movement must stand against oppression and waste. It must do its part in removing grievances, national and international. It must give its council in favor of peace and order, and it must help to educate men to believe that the nation which guarantees to its young men personal justice and personal opportunity has a greater glory than that which sends forth its youth to slaughter.

II.

Shall the Turk Go?

What shall we say of the expulsion of the Turk from Europe? Most of us say let him go, and he seems to be going. But we would not have him driven out because he is a Turk nor because he is a Moslem. Those are not good reasons. Difference in race or in religion is no valid cause for war. Nor is it really the habit of massacre to which the Turk seems addicted and by which he has stained the soil of Armenia and Syria as well as that of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece. The Turk has a long list of massacres because he has had a long lease of opportunity. The fault is not with the Turk but with the system. He has held alien lands in military servitude for 500 years. Others have done as he does when the opportunity or the necessity was forced upon them. Military pacification and military control over people who do not manage their own affairs spells always massacre. Massacre is war, the very worst side of war. It is war unrelieved by any lofty purpose. But more blood has been shed in the Balkans in a month than the Turks have shed in a century before. Yet there is a difference. There is real force in the Macedonian proverb "Better an end with horror, than horror without end." There is a Mexican proverb "The grass grows over the graves of those who fall in battle, but not over those slain by military order." The evil does not lie with the Turk as Turk. Turks are much like other people. Like other good soldiers, those who have tried it have no love for war. They would rather not kill nor be killed. But military occupation is irksome. A soldier insults a woman. This has been a soldier's privilege in most countries through the insolent ages. An insult is resented. An alien insults a soldier. A trader refuses to pay his taxes. A civilian complains of ill treatment. A boy shoots a soldier from behind a cactus hedge. The soldier seeks revenge. His comrades stand behind him. Whatever the provocation, "shooting up the town" is no novelty in history. Insolence begets resistance.

Resistance to the soldier is "treachery." The penalty of treachery is "massacre." This story has been told over and over again wherever there is military pacification and military occupation. It has been told in our day in Armenia and Adana and Macedonia. It has been told in the Oasis of Tripoli, in the Transvaal, in Samar, in Peking, in Bessarabia, in Korea, in Finland, in Zululand, in the Soudan, in the Congo, in Yucatan, in India, in Indo-China, in Arabia, in Egypt. It is not the soldier's duty to stand patiently under abuse. It is not his part to respect the rights of men. It is not the civilian's part to take in meekness the soldier's insults. And it is not the expulsion of the Turk that we hope for. The Turk is the least of our problems. We would put an end to the whole system which involves "the right to rule without the duty to protect." And in the long run, there is no protection for any people who have not some voice in their own affairs. Sooner or later comes the end to all imperial domination that strikes no deeper roots than force or fear.

III.

Why Turkey Fails

What shall we say of the failure of Turkey in the test of war? We are told by a leading military expert that "Turkey is being defeated because of her lack of preparation for war." Others have said that it was because her armies have been under German drill and armed with German guns, her adversaries being equipped in France. Others say that her armies contain too many Christians, who will not shoot nor fight their friends. Others, with a similar thought, say that she "has misgoverned Macedonia and Albania, and these in the crisis become inevitably and properly her enemies and not her friends, a source of weakness and doom instead of defense and strength."

May it not be that Turkey's failure in war is because of too much preparation, because she has prepared for nothing else?

Nothing else grows under military occupation. Turkey's old war debt of $509,000,000 is crushing to all her industries, prohibitive to all her hopes. As "the sick man of Europe" Turkey has been kept alive only by the persistence of his creditors. "Instead of being extinguished in the struggle for political existence because too weak to pay his debts, he had to be kept artificially alive in order to pay them."

The reputation of the Turk as a fighter comes down from the days when he was a wild frontiersman. For centuries he has been kept in garrison-towns, the worst possible school for physical vigor, giving a lassitude which even the drill of a German Field Marshal could not overcome. Perhaps this is not the true explanation, but it is as likely as the others. The Turkish army, it appears, was short of arms and powder and rations. But the soldiers may have had all there was. Too long prepared for war, the provisions for it had long since given out, and there was no money to get any more.

Chesterton tells us of approaching a distant shore, covered with dark forest. As he came nearer he saw that this forest had

no roots in the ground. It was made up wholly of hovering vultures. It was Turkey.

Professor Sumner of Yale once said: "There is no state of readiness for war. The notion calls for never-ending sacrifice. . . . It would absorb all the resources and activity of the state. This the great European states are now proving by experiment. . . . What we prepare for is what we get."

For hundreds of years Turkey has been preparing for war. She has always had on "the fighting edge." The "fighting edge" grows rusty. The standing army grows stale. But successful war depends on other resources. Other resources Turkey has not got,—can never get, because war is her business. Her people have not taken root,—not in Europe, not in Asia. They live in barracks, in encampments, not in a "continuing city."

IV.

The Fate of Armenia

What shall we say of Armenia in this crisis of the Balkans? Is Turkey in Asia to be left to its fate with the redemption of Turkey in Europe? Is the military Turk a different man on the other side of the Dardanelles?

There is no difference. Only this: the shrieks of victims grow fainter as the square of the distance increases. The military Turk is at home nowhere; and his rule is just as intolerable in Armenia, in Syria, in Adana, in Arabia even, as it is in Macedonia and Crete. It is not the Turk as Turk who is primarily at fault. The Turk as trader, farmer, artisan is likely to be a good man, a good citizen, according to his lights. The fault lies with the system. Irresponsible military occupation is the same the world over. That of the Turk has been longer continued than most others. It is so much the worse for that. Anything else is to be preferred, even the control of Russia. "There are degrees, even in hell," so an Armenian patriot writes me. And the people of Armenia look hopefully forward to a Russian invasion as a relief from the evils they suffer now. The process justly known as "the Strangling of Persia" is to Armenia a prayed-for relief. The strangling of a nationality, though brutal to the utmost, pinches less than the outrage of one's family and kindred.

But no rule of force unrelieved can be enduring. The right to govern must accept the duty of co-operative protection. The "wide-flung battle lines" of the world can hold nothing worth keeping if there grow up no other ties as bonds of empire. The best army in the world becomes an instrument of tyranny if it cannot touch the hearts of the people. Kipling's "thin red line of heroes" and Thackeray's "red-coat bully in his boots" differ mainly in the point of view.

There is no end to the Balkan crisis which does not include Armenia. The troubles cannot pass until tyranny passes. The minor questions of politics, Servia's needs, Austria's ambitions,

Roumania's deals, are of no consequence in comparison. The exploiters behind the foreign offices may quarrel over the spoils. They can arrange the map as they please. The essential thing is the redemption of the peoples.

What the Armenian wants is to be allowed to live as people live in other countries, "immunity from slaughter, plunder, torture and outrage on the soil of his own fatherland."

I give below a condensation of twelve demands from an Armenian appeal to the world (the work of Diana Agabeg Apcar).

(1) The Armenians should be allowed the right to bear arms and to establish a local militia in all the Armenian villages for self-protection against the raids of Kurd, Circassian, Turk and other Moslem robbers who are allowed the possession of arms and ammunition.

(2) The Armenians should be allowed the right to bear arms and to establish Armenian volunteer corps or local militia for protection against Moslem destruction of their homes, churches, schools, shops and industries.

(3) The Armenians should be allowed the right to bear arms in order to defend their own bodies and the bodies of their women and children from Moslem murder and outrage.

(4) The lands of the Armenians, filched from them by the Turkish authorities and made over to Moslems, should be restored.

(5) A judicial committee of twelve members, composed of six Armenians elected by the Armenian National Assembly and six Moslems deputed by the Government, should be appointed for the examination of title deeds of lands and for the restoration to the rightful owners of their lands. In the event of disagreement over the disputed properties between the Armenian and Moslem members of the judicial committee, the case should not be referred to any Turkish Court, but submitted to the arbitration of two foreign Consuls, the Armenians choosing one for themselves and the Moslems another.

(6) That Moslem officials should not be employed to collect taxes in Armenian villages, but the taxes in all the Armenian villages should be collected by Armenian tax-gatherers appointed by the Armenian National Assembly.

(7) That the Armenians should be allowed to establish their own courts of justice for the purpose of administering justice and conducting litigation between Armenian and Armenian, and for deciding all questions relating to marriage, divorce, estate, inheritance, etc., appertaining to themselves.

(8) That the Armenians should be allowed the right to establish their own prisons for the incarceration of offending Armenians, and in no case should an Armenian be imprisoned in a Turkish prison.

(9) That irrespective of the office of the Turkish Governor, an Armenian Governor elected by the Armenian National Assembly shall be appointed in every province of Lesser and Greater Armenia for the protection of the Armenians.

(10) That the Armenian Governor shall be assisted by an Armenian legislative council composed of six Armenians elected by the Armenian National Assembly.

(11) That the Armenians should be allowed the right of sending their own delegate to the Hague Conferences.

(12) That no reforms in Armenia should be left to the promises, the control or administration of the Turkish Government. (All Turkish reforms are the prelude to Turkish massacre.)

V.

The Great War of Europe

What shall we say of the Great War of Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it will never come. Humanly speaking, it is impossible.

Not in the physical sense, of course, for with weak, reckless and godless men nothing evil is impossible. It may be, of course, that some half-crazed archduke or some harassed minister of state, shall half-unknowing give the signal for Europe's conflagration. In fact, the agreed signal has been given more than once within the last few months. The tinder is well dried and laid in such a way as to make the worst of this catastrophe. All Europe cherishes is ready for the burning. Yet Europe recoils and will recoil, even in the dread stress of spoil-division of the Balkan War.

Behind the sturdy forms of the Bulgarian farmers lurks the sinister figure of Russian intrigue. Russia and Austria, careless of their neighbors, careless of obligations, find in this their opportunity. And the nations of Europe in their degree are bound to one or the other of these malcontents. Neither Russia nor Austria can be trusted to keep the peace even in her own interest, for both, through debt abroad and discontent at home, are in a condition of perpetual crisis.

The financial exploiters of Europe which control the "Great Powers" are very active behind the scenes. The huge debt of Turkey is mainly held in France. French financiers arm the Balkan troops and pay their expenses. French concessionaires strive with English, German, Austrian for everything worth holding in Turkey. The "sick man of Europe," owes his continued existence as well as his final demise to these industrious parasites.

But accident aside, the Triple Entente lined up against the Triple Alliance, we shall expect no war. Some glimpses of the reasons why appear daily in the press. We read that German and that Austrian banks try in vain to secure short loans in New York,

even at eight per cent. We learn that great bankers refuse absolutely to loan on any terms for war. We learn that on the day of Montenegro's declaration of war, the nominal value of stocks and bonds in Europe fell to the extent of nearly $7,000,000,000. The loss of France alone, the creditor of Europe, is given at $800,000,000. The decline in England in three years is set down at $9,250,000.

At the same time the house of Krupp, the greatest builders of war tools, reports a surplus for the year of $12,500,000. A twelve per cent dividend was declared, besides the setting apart of $4,000,000, for welfare work and capital reserves. The armament builders of France can doubtless show a like profit, but the details are not yet public.

The gains of war and war talk go to the vultures. The cost falls on the people. Whatever else happens, the common man stands to lose in war.

The expenses of the proposed general war are thus tabulated by Professor Charles Richet of the University of Paris:

Austria	2,600,000 men
England	1,500,000
France	3,400,000
Germany	3,600,000
Italy	2,800,000
Roumania	300,000
Russia	7,000,000
	21,200,000

If these nations—supposed to be diplomatically concerned in the question of whether the obscure Albanian port of Durazzo should fall to Servia or to Austria, neither of the two having the slightest claim to it—should rush into the fight, the expense would run at $50,000,000 per day, a sum to be greatly increased with the sure rise of prices.

The table of Richet (here translated from francs to dollars) deserves most careful attention.

Daily cost of a great European War.

1.	Feed of men	$12,600,000
2.	Feed of horses	1,000,000
3.	Pay (European rates)	4,250,000
4.	Pay of workmen in arsenals and ports (100 per day)	1,000,000
5.	Transportation (60 miles 10 days)	2,100,000
6.	Transportation of provisions	4,200,000
7.	Munitions: Infantry 10 cartridges a day	4,200,000
8.	Artillery: 10 shots per day	1,200,000
9.	Marine: 2 shots per day	400,000
10.	Equipment	4,200,000
11.	Ambulances: 500,000 wounded or ill ($1 per day)	500,000
12.	Cuirasses	500,000
13.	Reduction of imports	5,000,000
14.	Help to the poor (20 cents per day to 1 in 10)	6,800,000
15.	Destruction of towns, etc	2,000,000
	Total per day	$49,950,000

To all this we may add the horrors of the air, the cost of aeroplanes and of burning cities which this monstrous abomination of murder may render inhumanly possible. The nation which uses instruments like these against a sister nation can boast no advance over the Red Indian and his scalping knife.

In this connection we must remember that Europe still owes $27,000,000,000 for old war debts, that her present nominal capital that in all her banks and vaults there exists but seven or eight billion dollars of actual coin or bullion, a third of this locked up or tied up in vaults from which it cannot escape. The total of coin money and bullion in circulation in the whole world is not far from $11,000,000,000.

The growth of credit in the last forty years has been without conceivable precedent. The movable credit of Europe in 1871 did not exceed $40,000,000,000.

The masters of credit are staggered at the hazards of present day war. Wars of a certain class may be tolerated, others may be connived at in the interest of local exploitation, but the great wars

ending perhaps—whoever is victorious—in the total destruction of European credit, present appalling risks unknown to any earlier generation. The people are slowly reaching the conclusion that no nation or group of nations has the right to place the world in such danger.

The bankers will not find the money for such a fight, the industries of Europe will not maintain it, the statesmen cannot. So whatever the bluster or apparent provocation, it comes to the same thing at the end. There will be no general war until the masters direct the fighters to fight. The masters have much to gain, but vastly more to lose, and their signal will not be given.

It is not alone the paralysis of debt which checks the rush of armies. The common man is having a word to say. While the waning aristocracies are everywhere for war, and while the man with nothing to lose—the man of the galleries in the music hall—repeats the echo, the good citizen sees the world in a new light. He is not so ready for a fool's errand to Durazzo as he was a couple of generations ago for a similar mission to Sebastopol. The cause of peace has moved forward in these years, and in the only way in which real progress in civilization can be made—through the enlightenment of the people.

VI.

"Our Ships" and Our Money

What shall we say as to "free ships" and the Panama Canal? If our Nation has agreed to treat all ships alike, including our own, let us stand by that agreement. Of violation of treaties we have been more than once accused. If we know what we have promised, let us stand by it, even though it seems strange that we cannot "throw our money to the birds" while every other nation is free to do it.

But why "throw our money to the birds"? Do "the birds" require it or appreciate it? What claim have coastwise steamships of the United States to use our canal at the expense of the American people? But these are "our ships" we say. Since when have they become "our ships"? Have the New York and London capitalists who own them ever turned them over to us? Have they ever agreed to divide their profits with those who make great profits possible? The great enemy of democracy is privilege. To grant a concession of any sort having money value without a corresponding return, is "privilege." The granting of privilege in the past is the source of most of the great body of political evils from which the civilized world suffers to-day.

While declaiming against privilege, even while exalting its curtailment as the greatest of national issues to-day, we start new privileges without hesitation. We throw into the hands of an unknown group of men, to become sooner or later a shipping trust, a vast unknown and increasing sum of money extorted by indirect taxation from the people of this country. No accounting is asked from them; no returns for our generosity. We give them yearly, to begin with, as much as an American laborer can earn in 4,000 years; in other words, we place at their service and at our expense 4,000 of our workingmen. From our tax-roll we pass over to them the payments each year of 10,000 families. And all because these are our ships. "Our ships"—we have here the primal fallacy of privilege, a fallacy dominant the world over, and which is the

leading agent in the impending insolvency of this spendthrift world.

In Europe and America taxes have doubled in the last fifteen years, and half of this extra tax has gone to build up "our ships," "our bankers," "our commerce," "our manufactures," "our promoters," "our defense" in nation after nation, while the "man lowest down" who bears the brunt of these taxes is never called on to share its benefits. The ships that bear our flag in order to go through our canal at our expense are not "our ships." By very fact of free tolls, we know them for the ships of our enemy,—for the arch-enemy of democracy is privilege.

VII.

The Open Door at Panama

What shall we say to the suggestion that tolls be free on the Panama Canal for a certain period of years to the ships of all the world?

Why not? The cost would not be burdensome. We have already given away a large part of our expected receipts. We have done this in spite of our treaty agreement that we should do nothing of the kind.

In giving free passage to our coastwise ships, why not make it free to all the world? It would be a most gracious act, an act most characteristic of a great nation which values generous action above money. It would show that our occupation of the Canal Zone had in part at least the altruistic desire to help the commerce of the world. It would tend to justify this occupation. It would "save our face," and save us from facing the Hague Tribunal to answer for the violation of a treaty. It would save us from our folly of a special and needless subsidy to vessels engaged in our coastwise trade. It would make easy and natural the neutralization of the Canal Zone. It would relieve us from the worry of the ruthless militants who would make the canal zone invulnerable on land and unapproachable by sea. It would save us the monstrous cost of the fortifications they have already coaxed us or scared us to begin. It would cost us something, to be sure, this world-embracing generosity. Let it be so,—we can afford it. We have already paid more money for less worthy purposes. It would restore our self-respect and the respect of other nations. We are losing both under the statutes as they stand. Why not declare the open door at Panama and keep it open at our own expense for half-a-dozen years? Experience may bring wisdom; we can act better later. Besides, in the fine words of Mr. Roosevelt, "It always pays for a nation to be a gentleman!"

VIII.

What Ship Goes First?

What shall we say as to the first ship to pass through the Panama Canal? Let it be an American ship, bound on foreign commerce. If possible, let it be a merchant ship on its peaceful way to one of our sister republics.

The date of the opening of the Panama Canal is approaching. A certain symbolism of the thoughts and purposes of the people of the United States will be associated with the character of the first vessel which shall pass through the Panama Canal. May this symbolism be one of international peace and good will, and of that alone.

The main function of the Panama Canal is one of peace. It is to link nations more closely by bonds of travel and of commerce. To symbolize this purpose should be chosen a vessel engaged in the activities of peace, one sailing under the flag of the republic, bound to or from the shores of this nation; one which shall bear the friendliness of the United States of America to the nations of the world, wherever its course may tend.

These purposes of the United States could not be fitly symbolized by a ship of war, however great her excellence and however perfect her equipment. The existence of such vessels may be a necessity in an age in which international war is still legalized as a means of settling international differences. But the people of the republic wish not to glorify this necessity. They wish that war may be made the last, and not the first, resort when international problems arise. At the best the warship harks backward to the history of the past; while the ship of travel and commerce points forward to our nation's ideals of the future.

This great democracy will find its future greatness not in conquest, not even in self-defense against would-be conquerors, but in friendly cooperation, the brotherhood of men and nations, the ennobling of the individual man, and in increasing recognition of the worth of human life.

IX.

Twenty-Five Thousand at Panama

What shall we say of the demand for 25,000 soldiers at Panama?

We are told that 25,000 men are needed to guard the great canal from "the enemy."

Uncle Sam, as we know, is still a very young man. He hasn't yet got his business head. But he has Yankee blood in him and he is beginning to figure.

A new $400,000,000 canal ought to yield $16,000,000 a year in net returns. Uncle Sam doesn't expect this, for he is an idealist and would help on the commerce of the world. Besides, he has already given a sixth of his receipts to build up his cherished "Coastwise Shipping Trust." But he figures that 25,000 soldiers at Panama may cost $25,000,000 a year. Forts and fleets and fighting mosquitoes may cost him how much he does not dare to guess. All this amounts to the interest on $1,000,000,000 and more.

One of Uncle Sam's most faithful teachers and most loyal friends has figured most of this out for him. Professor Emory R. Johnson, canal commissioner, estimates the total cost of the canal at $375,000,000. All this, interest and principal, must be paid from taxes or from canal tolls.

For the first two or three years, the most that can be expected in returns is about $12,600,000 per year, if all vessels pay. If coastwise shipping is exempted, this will fall to less than $10,500,000. In ten years it is hoped that the toll receipts will rise to $17,000,000 yearly. The coastwise exemption will reduce this to less than $15,000,000, unless that useless grant of special privilege to "the most heavily protected interest in the country" should be repealed.

"It is estimated that $19,250,000 will be required annually to make the canal commercially self-sustaining. This total is made

up of $3,500,000 for operating and maintenance expenses; $500,000 for sanitation and zone government; $250,000, the annuity payable to Panama under the treaty of 1903; $11,250,000 to pay 3 per cent on the $375,000,000 invested in the canal; and $3,750,000 for an amortization fund of 1 per cent per annum upon the cost of the canal."

When Uncle Sam sees the plans for fortifications, for ships for long range and short range defense, the bill for soldiers and officers, and the cost of creating a military instead of a commercial atmosphere, he will finally conclude that it is cheaper and may be better to let "the enemy" seize the canal, furnishing all the fortresses, fleets and soldiers for its protection, while he puts his own money into better ventures.

But Uncle Sam cannot escape so easily, because there is no "enemy." No nation on earth would take the Panama canal as a gift, if the gift involved defense by land and sea, or if it involved the loss of the friendship (that is, the commerce) of the United States.

X.

The Canal and its Enemies

What answer shall we give to Admiral Mahan's demand for a greater navy because the Panama Canal weakens our line of defense?

This tireless sea-dog, in the New York *Times,* tells us that the Panama Canal, once built and provided with costly fortifications, so far from strengthening our position in the militant world (at the best, precarious), adds still further to our weakness. Of our whole coast "it is through its isolation the most exposed. It is intrinsically the weak link of the chain." "The fortifications and associated troops are to insure this hold on the canal while the navy may be absent on its mission of action in either ocean, but neither works nor troops will secure ultimate security if the navy be inferior to the enemy's."

The Admiral does not state who the enemy is whose imaginary attacks we are spending so much good money to repel. He dreams of war, but only of war against "the enemy." We may infer, however, that it is Japan who is on the watch for this, our weakest spot. He tells us that "the population of our Pacific states is less than 20 to the square mile, while that of Japan is over 300." He further clinches his purpose with reference to an utterance some years old of that fine old Japanese gentleman, Count Itagaki, who has spent his last years trying to remove the element of heredity from titles of nobility, and, thus far without success, to get rid of his own title of Count. Only the Emperor can cancel an honor of this sort. Count Itagaki believes that the people of the world are entitled to access to any part of it, and that the doors of America should not be closed to Japanese who may wish to take their part in the building of the West. Perhaps he is right. It is a question of social philosophy, and this noble-spirited old man has a broad outlook. But this is far, very far, from advocating an armed attack by Japanese ships and soldiers on the Isthmus of Panama. It is infinitely far from ensuring feats of arms or deeds

of violence. Some excellent men in the United States have thought that Canada should have accepted our views of reciprocity. To say this is very far from committing armies to invade Canada, putting reciprocity through by force of arms.

The purposes of Japan are very simple. She wishes to hold her own at home, to build up her industries, and to pay her debts; and meanwhile to make good her ventures in Korea and Manchuria. She has passed through the terrible calamities of the war with Russia, and her tremendous burden of debt can not be lifted for half a century. She would not fight us if she could. She could not if she would,—and there is nothing in the world to fight about. It would be easier for us to seize any Japanese port than for her to seize Panama. There will be no seizing done on either side.

When information as to Japan's history, purposes and resources is so readily accessible it is not easy to be patient with those belated war experts who talk of Japanese invasions, whether in America, Australia or New Zealand.

XI.

The Size of the Navy

What shall we say of the size of our navy? How many warships do we need? Can we do without any?

The answers to these questions belong to experts,—experts in world-civilization on the one hand, in ship-building and ship-using on the other. Perhaps we have no such experts in this country. In any event they have never come together, and our people have never had a rational answer to these questions.

Let us analyze the conditions. For offense, we need no ships. There is no other land we wish to rule, no nation we wish to injure.

For defense, just as little. There is no power which hopes to rule over us, no enemy that dares or cares to attack. The business of America is linked with all other business. The commerce of America enriches all our customers. It is not good for business, as Benjamin Franklin once observed, "to knock our customers on the head."

We care not to waste our money on mere rivalry. We are in no Marathon race to see who can pile up the largest fleet or who can excavate the biggest deficit. We care not a straw, when we are in our senses, whether our navy in speed or size or weight of iron stands first or tenth or twentieth. Those who stimulate this rivalry have never given to us the slightest reason why we should feel it. We do not build ships to awe the world. If we did we should fail, for the world is too busy with its own affairs to be afraid of a self-respecting republic, no matter how terrible its disguise of power. To call a great navy an instrument of peace is one of the giant jokes of the century. The way to lasting peace is not through fear nor through bankruptcy. The world knows—and we ought to know—that we lie outside the sordid and selfish game they call world politics.

The most worthy reasons for a navy in the United States, so far as I can read, are these: The need of a certain dignity in public occasions on the sea, and the need of a speedy way to help our American citizens who through no fault of their own may

find embarrassment in foreign lands. The mission of the Tennessee and Montana to the shores of Turkey is a legitimate duty of a nation, and the nation wants ample and adequate means to fulfill such duties.

But a fleet to rival the swollen navies of the Great Powers is not needed for this purpose. If $13,000,000 per year was a generous allowance for our navy in 1881, covering amply all demands, it is not clear why, in 1911, with no greater or different duties, this cost need rise to $121,000,000. A larger population, a few more helpless dependencies, a more costly type of ship,—all these we may allow, making a two-fold or three-fold increase perhaps. But no one has suggested a reason why the cost should be tenfold,—and there is no reason.

The navy, like the army, should be just as efficient as possible, and just as small as its actual need permits.

Surely we want nothing more. For the cost and upkeep of the four super-dreadnoughts now asked for, we could build at Washington the one great national university of the world: one of which every scholar or investigator the world over must make use; one which could bring to its halls almost every teacher, investigator or inventor of the first rank the world over; one by the side of which Harvard, Columbia, Chicago or Wisconsin, Oxford, Cambridge, Berlin, Leipzig, Paris as well would seem like fresh-water colleges. And this would not be for twenty years at most, the life of a warship. It would give to America the intellectual leadership of the world perhaps for all time. There is no University in the world which spends on its teaching force a million of dollars a year. A million is the interest on only twenty-five millions. How much will sixty millions yield?

Or if the money were used in another way, such a sum would go far toward doubling the area of the South and West. To restrain the flood waters, to pour them out on the arid lands, to gather the power increment of all falling waters. No one can foresee the extent to which these enterprises would add to the wealth and to the effective happiness of our people. It is worth our while to consider relative values, to spend generously where spending counts and to refrain from spending when the only motive is rivalry or inertia, the inability to break loose from an evil fashion, a fashion set in other nations and in other times.

XII.

The Monroe Doctrine

What shall we say of the Monroe Doctrine as an incitement to war? In an address before the Harvard Union a leading general is reported as saying:

"We are the only nation which stands for definite policies which are almost certain to bring us into conflict with other nations which are expanding. The Monroe Doctrine and our policy of not allowing even commercial coaling stations of other powers in American waters are practically sure to cramp foreign nations at some time." It is further assumed that this will force these nations into war with us, hence the need of 450,000 more men who may be mobilized as soldiers in case of need.

The Monroe Doctrine has never been made part of the policy of the United States except by the tacit acceptance of the dictum of Monroe: President Monroe declared "that the United States will regard as unfriendly, any attempt on the part of European powers to extend their operations in the Western hemisphere, or any interference to oppress or in any manner control the destiny of governments in this hemisphere whose independence has been acknowledged by the United States."

This is a reasonable proposition enough, provided that we do not push it to offensive conclusions. South America has been saved from the fate of Africa, though it has had its own troubles of anarchy and waste. In so far the Monroe Doctrine has served its useful purpose. No European nation intends to violate it. None could afford to do so even if it had not to reckon with the United States. Individuals in Europe may scoff at it, as we sometimes speak disrespectfully of the "Spiked Helmet," but talk like this may not be taken seriously.

It is only where our claims go beyond Monroe, when we seem to patronize our neighbors or to use them for our own benefit, when we assume special rights in Latin America, "spheres of influence" or other claims that suggest possible schemes of spolia-

tion, that opposition arises. And this opposition is not from Europe but from the South American republics. These people, confident in their own resources, naturally resent anything that looks like an assumption of superiority on the part of the United States. Patronage, as such, is not acceptable as a substitute for friendship. Insistence on an extreme interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine has developed the very reasonable Calvo Doctrine that South America is quite capable of taking care of herself. Attempted forcible collection of bad debts has given rise to the Drago Doctrine that no nation should collect money for its subjects by force of arms.

The Monroe Doctrine does not object to the docking privileges or other conveniences of friendly commerce. As it was promulgated before coaling stations were ever dreamed of, it involves no objection to friendly transfers which do not subject the people of a republic to the rule of a monarch.

Dr. Manuel de Oliveira Lima, a leading statesman of Brazil, has recently declared that South America is utterly opposed to the Monroe Doctrine as it stands. "Not that they do not appreciate the protection of the power of the United States, but that they are resentful of the assumption by this country of the power of a protectorate."

He suggests that this doctrine be made, not a decree of the United States alone, but a principle of Pan-America, the "communal opposition of the nations of the Western hemisphere against encroachment, on the principles laid down by President Monroe."

Why not? This would blend the Monroe Doctrine, the Calvo Doctrine and the Drago Doctrine into one broad and reasonable principle, acceptable to all really concerned.

We should be large enough, generous enough, broad-minded enough, to forego our national leadership in this matter for the general good-will of the continent.

If our Monroe Doctrine as bluntly or acridly stated is a cause for war, it will be very easy to do our part in making it a cause for peace. And the way to do this has been well indicated by the statesman of Brazil.

A recent effort to add to the Monroe Doctrine a clause in-

cluding occupation of American territory by foreign syndicates does not affect this problem in any way. The recent Senate Resolution, itself based on misinformation, has no validity whatever. The President of the United States, better acquainted than the Senate with the facts concerning Magdalena Bay, did not join in this declaration. It is therefore null and void.

"The Senate cannot declare the policy of this Government, at any rate, because it cannot make it. It is only part of the treaty-making power and only part of the legislative power and only part of the executive power." The President is therefore under no obligation to follow the dictates of such a resolution, and no President would do it unless such action was clearly required by the public benefit.

If, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine makes for war, it is not necessary to repeal it or to modify it, but only to share it with our sister republics. Then it will again make for international peace in accordance with the original purpose of President Monroe.

XIII.

Military Conscription

What shall we say to the efforts of military experts in Great Britain, the United States, and in the great British colonies in behalf of universal compulsory military service?

Only this: we will have nothing of it. It is not American. It is not democratic. It is not wholesome. This service has been the curse of continental Europe. That no man is a soldier against his will is the badge of freedom in Great Britain and the United States. "Every Englishman's house is his castle." Every Englishman's body (except as freedom is lost by conviction of crime or of incompetence) is secure from official manhandling. The primal evil of compulsory military service is its onslaught on personal freedom. The political evil is that its purpose being war, it keeps the air filled with talk of war. War would vanish if people could only "forget it." It is in itself so irrational, so costly, so brutalizing, that we would have none of it if we could separate it from ideas of "patriotism" and of glory. The conscripts think of war as the ultimate end for which they are "doing time." "The conscripts hope for war," writes a Bavarian sharpshooter, "because they look for a chance to get even with their officers." The petty officers, swarming in multitudes, have no other thought than war. The higher officers (not all of them) look forward to actual war for exercise, for promotion, or for the test of their unverified theories or of their weapons rusting through years of peace. All these men idle or malemployed pile up the taxes, giving the workingman more and more mouths to feed.

We need not deny a certain value—physical, mental, or even moral—to military drill. We need not deny that a standing army may be made in some degree a school for the betterment of the individual. We would not in the least depreciate the work of those men who have given their lives to the upbuilding of the character of boys in military institutes. To act together, to act promptly, to obey orders,—all these may constitute the best of training for young men. All this has a value wholly outside of war. It has nothing to do with unwilling conscription.

Enforced military service of grown men bears the same relation to military discipline of willing students that stoking a

furnace bears to building one's own campfire in a forest. The successful military school has sympathetic teachers, men to whom the end of the work is character-building. It deals with boys at that age in which order and obedience furnish the best lessons. It is as far away as possible from the atmosphere of barracks and brothels, the chief features of the idle standing army.

Military service considers only the purpose of war. Its discipline the world over is under incompetent, narrow-minded, irresponsible, often profane and brutal teachers. As a school it is at the best most costly, inefficient and belated. Its work is begun too late in life to have educational value, even were the war authorities anxious to give the individual soldier industrial or other training to fit him for civil life. Besides this, the standing army has been for centuries the reservoir of the "red plague" parasites. Under the most favorable conditions physicians have been able to reduce the number of victims of venereal disease from about one in three to one in six. In tropical service the proportion of men ruined or half ruined is far greater.

The "white slave traffic" of to-day is an outgrowth of the standing army. Requisitions have been published, signed by commanding officers and frankly drawn on associations of pimps. The term "white slave" was first used by Napoleon III, who applied it to his conscript soldiers, those whom Napoleon I called "chair pour le canon"—"meat for the cannon."

In 1867, the great journalist Émile Girardin wrote: "If war is to be suppressed in Europe, this must be done gradually. The first step is the abolition of the 'white slave traffic,'—that is, of military serfdom, the suppression of the drawing lots for men. It is here that a beginning should be made."

Now that the conscriptionists are hard at work in England, active in the United States, and successful in New Zealand, it is time to stand for individual freedom and individual peace. We make no criticism of military drill in schools or other well guarded establishments, when it is voluntary and part of a well-planned course. We pledge ourselves to a permanent fight against the military conscription which burdens Continental Europe. We find our answer in the words of the Honorable Mr. Runciman, of the House of Commons, spoken at Elland in oppo-

sition to the plans of Lord Roberts in England: "Lord Roberts knows little of the North of England if he imagines that it would ever submit to conscription. War is only inevitable when statesmen cannot find a way around or through difficulties that may arise, or are so wicked that they prefer the hellish method of war to any other method of solution, or are so weak as to allow soldiers, armament-makers, or scaremongers to direct their policy."

In any international difference, war should stand as *the last resort* and not the first. If force is kept in the background and all other methods are tried out first, there will not be many wars in your day or mine. The few that we shall see will have the motive of robbery of the weak, or else the motive of revolt against age-long operations of "military pacification."

XIV.

The Abolition of Piracy

What shall we say to the plea of Dr. Frederick Harsley at the University of Berlin, that all war operations at sea should be confined to the three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction?

Why not? This would be a great move forward, and in the line of the efforts of Sir John Brunner and many other good men to safeguard private property at sea. Private property on land, if not used for war purposes, is immune from hostile seizure. It has been so since 1899. But private property at sea may be seized by the crews of hostile vessels and taken as prizes for their personal benefit. This right to plunder has been supposed to stimulate officers and men to patriotic activity. By this means England once destroyed Holland's commerce; and those who forget that we live in a changing world have wished to hold on to the legalized piracy, as a means, some time, of doing the same thing with Germany. This, it was said, "insures not only England's overlordship of the sea, but also her supremacy of trade for all times." This is no longer true, and England's insistence on the right of piracy is plunging the world into insolvency. It is this vicious claim which explains, if it does not excuse, the huge naval armament of Germany, for "it is impossible to take, lying down, such a perpetual menace."

But the cruelty and folly of legalized piracy has become apparent to wise and just men in England. The next Hague Conference will see a determined effort to do away with it, as we have already done away with legalized pillage on land.

Now why not go a step farther and make the sea an open highway on which all sorts of vessels shall be safe from all form of attack? Why not make belligerent nations confine their brawls to their own shores? All the sea outside the three-mile limit belongs to all the world. Let it be made immune from war. And let it be provided, at international expense, with ships for protection of commerce—not for its destruction. Let us have,

as Dr. Harsley urges, a life-saving patrol for warning and for help when the icebergs come down from the north. Let us join to destroy all derelicts. Let us find the dangers of the open sea, and jointly remove them, without adding to them the dangers involved in the operations of ships of war.

The naturalists of the world, led by Paul Sarasin of Basle, have already made a plea for the prohibition of the killing of the great sea-going mammals, Fur Seal, Sea Otter, Walrus, Sea Lion, Whale, outside of the three-mile limits of the coasts where these creatures breed. On no other terms can these splendid animals be preserved for future generations. Why not do the same by Man, the greatest of all seafaring creatures? Why not let his path at sea be free from all dangers from his fellow-men? Why not recognize the supreme value of the right to trade and travel? If men must be killed on a large scale in international rivalry, why not take the matter out of the world jurisdiction and confine the slaughter to the territorial waters of the nations concerned?

The navies of the world must melt away. The taxpayers of the world cannot stand the drain much longer. Why not take away their chief excuse and build up the merchant fleets instead?

XV.

Entangling Alliances

What shall we say of Washington's warning that we of the United States should keep free from "entangling alliances"? Do we realize how sound this advice was, and that the provision of our constitution which prevents secret treaties is one of the most valuable clauses in that noble document?

In it, we may remember, it is provided that an international treaty originating with the executive must be approved openly by the Senate before it can have any value. No minister, no president, can secretly pledge the nation to any line of action. No president, no senate, no congress, acting alone can make any declaration of national policy. For these reasons, the United States must stand outside of the tangled snarl of concessions and intrigues which we call "world politics." It must play its international games with open hands. It cannot be the secret friend of any other nation. It cannot be a secret enemy, because all acts of friendship or of hostility are open to all the world.

In the present crisis in European politics the people in no nation know where the nation stands. By the law of "continuity of policy" Sir Edward Grey, in London, is bound to the international agreements made by his predecessor in office, his opponent in politics. No English citizen knows how far he is pledged to France, or to what degree he is to be blind to the designs of Russia. He knows that there is a "triple entente," a three-cornered understanding, and that this entente pledges England to inaction in Morocco, Persia or Mongolia and to acute and active protest should Germany attempt to extend her control by force. In like fashion Germany is bound to Austria, to Italy, to Turkey, in varying degrees; and no German knows when his empire's responsibility in the renewed Triple Alliance may leave off. Germany may suspect Austria of a desire to fight, in order to secure unity at home. She may disapprove of Italian greed and folly. She may deplore the fate of Turkey or she may

recognize it as just or inevitable. No good citizen of Germany cares a straw whether Durazzo is in Servian or in Austrian hands, or in the hands of its own people to whom it really belongs. The very existence of Durazzo is no concern of his. But the secret treaty may force him to give up his life somewhere in the blood-washed Balkans, that Austria may block Servia's hoped for "window to the sea." He can only guess at the future. He must await the outcome of the secret treaty before he can define his own patriotism.

The secret treaty is a relic of the military state. The civilized world is still organized on the mediaeval theory that war is a natural function to be expected in the normal course of events, not a hideous moral, physical, and financial catastrophe. In the old theory as expounded by Machiavelli, the king has no other business but war. It is the duty of his ministers to find weak places in the defenses of other kings through which war may be successful, and to find, after the fact, excuses by which war can be justified. The late Italian war was begun and continued on strictly mediaeval lines. The secret treaty, the concession to a friendly power, the artificial interference with a rival,—all these belong to the days of Machiavelli. If all parties concerned could come out into the open, where the United States is forced to stand, we should soon have an end to the Anglo-German struggle, of the rivalry between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

Outworn ideas of national glory, outworn figures of speech as to national purposes, outworn mediaevalism in our conception of the state,—all these find expression in the "secret treaty," the "entangling alliance," which is a chief obstacle in the way of the conciliation of nations.

XVI.

The Pest of Glory

What shall we say of the progress in the art of killing in these centuries of Christian civilization?

Benjamin Franklin, in 1782, after the battle of Martinique, wrote thus of what he elsewhere called the "Pest of Glory": "A young Angel of distinction being sent down to this world on some business for the first time, had an old courier spirit assigned him as a guide. They arrived over the seas of Martinico in the middle of the long day of obstinate fight between the fleets of Rodney and de Grasse. When, through the crowds of smoke, he saw the fire of the guns, the decks covered with mangled limbs and bodies dead or dying, the ships sinking, burning or blown into the air, and the quantity of pain, misery and destruction the crews yet alive were thus with so much eagerness dealing around to one another: he turned eagerly to his guide and said: 'You blundering blockhead you, so ignorant of your business; you undertook to conduct me to Earth, and you have brought me to Hell.' 'No, sir,' replied the guide; 'I have made no mistake. This is really the Earth, and these are men. Devils never treat each other in this cruel manner. They have more sense and more of what men call humanity.'"

Gustaf Janson of Sweden, in 1912, one hundred and thirty years later, after the battle of the Tripoli Oasis, wrote thus of what he called "the pride of war":

The bird-man had returned from his flight into the desert where the bombs he threw had stirred up the sands about the Arab encampment.

"The general shook him warmly by the hand once more and stood for a few minutes sunk in thought. 'Gentlemen,' be began suddenly, turning to the officers, 'it is incredible how the technique of war has changed. Telephones, telegraphs, wireless communications—war makes use of all these. It presses every new

invention into its service. Really, most impressive. I have just been reading the latest aviation news from Europe. Our ally Germany and our blood-relation France possess at this moment the largest fleets of aeroplanes in the world. The distance between Metz and Paris can be covered in a few hours. The three hundred aeroplanes which Germany possesses at this moment, all constructed and bought in France, could throw down ten thousand kilos of dynamite on the metropolis of the world in less than half an hour. This is a positively gigantic thought! In the middle of the night these three hundred flying-machines cross the border, and before daybreak Paris is a heap of ruins! Magnificent, gentlemen, magnificent! . . . Unexpectedly, without any previous warning, the rain of dynamite bursts over the town. One explosion follows on the other. Hospitals, theatres, schools, museums, public buildings, private houses—all are demolished. The roofs break in, the floors sink through to the cellars, crumbling ruins block up the streets. The sewers break and send their foul contents over everything . . . everything. The water pipes burst and there are floods. The gas pipes burst, gas streams out and explodes and causes an outbreak of fire. The electric light goes out. You hear sound of people running together, cries for help, shrieking and wailing, the splashing of water, the roaring of fire. And above it all can be heard the detonations occurring with mathematical precision. Walls fall in, whole buildings disappear in the gaping ground. Men, women and children rush about mad with terror among the ruins. They drown in filth, they are burnt, blown to pieces in explosions, annihilated, exterminated. Blood streams over the ruins and filth; gradually the shrieks for help die down. When the last flying-machine has done its work and turned northwards again, the bombardment is finished. In Paris a stillness reigns, such as has never reigned there before.

" 'We can imagine, on the other hand, that the French have carried out this same operation against Berlin, or possibly London. Who knows what political combination the future may have in store? But be that as it may, it only remains to us gratefully to dedicate ourselves to the new and glorious task now set before us. Gentlemen, I bare my head before the marvelous and unceasing progress of mankind.' The general removed his cap, and

his voice vibrated with gratitude to the merciful Providence which would perhaps grant that he would live to see this vision come true; and he continued: 'In the face of this triumphant progress which I have just described I am not overstepping the mark when I say that we are approaching perfection.' "

In 1912 Israel Zangwill, in "The War God," writes:

"To safeguard peace we must prepare for war"—
I know that maxim; it was forged in hell.
This wealth of ships and guns inflames the vulgar
And makes the very war it guards against.
The God of War is now a man of business,
With vested interests.
So much sunk Capital, such countless callings,
The Army, Navy, Medicine, the Church—
To bless and bury—Music, Engineering,
Red-tape Departments, Commissariats,
Stores, Transports, Ammunition, Coaling-stations,
Fortifications, Cannon-foundries, Shipyards,
Arsenals, Ranges, Drill-halls, Floating Docks,
War-loan Promoters, Military Tailors,
Camp-followers, Canteens, War Correspondents,
Horse-breeders, Armourers, Torpedo-builders,
Pipeclay and Medal Vendors, Big Drum Makers,
Gold Lace Embroiderers, Opticians, Buglers,
Tent-makers, Banner-weavers, Powder-mixers,
Crutches and Cork Limb Manufacturers,
Balloonists, Mappists, Heliographers,
Inventors, Flying Men, and Diving Demons,
Beelzebub and all his hosts, who, whether
In Water, Earth, or Air, among them pocket—
When Trade is brisk—a million pounds a week!

It is said that, for a century or more after the death of Jĕsus, no follower of his was enrolled in any army or took part in any battle. This may not be literally true, but it was true in spirit. The centurion, Maximilian, we are told, "threw down his military belt at the head of his legion, saying: 'I am a Christian, therefore I cannot fight!' "; and these words, says Harnack, became a common formula with men who believed in a brotherhood not to be achieved through killing. It was only under Constantine (A.D. 312) that the Cross was brought into the service of war.

XVII.

The Force of Arms

What shall we say to the claim that the stability of a nation must rest on compulsion; that in the last analysis authority means force of arms? In America, we have thought that in the free will of a free people there lay a force of union greater than the power of any army. We have supposed that the real force behind our institution lay in public opinion, the collective judgment of free men.

This is a force, we know, with which we all must reckon; a force that stands at the opposite pole from the force of arms,—the force of public opinion. Is there not a fallacy somewhere in our use of the word "force"? The "force of arms" is not a "force"; it is a fear,—the fear of being murdered. It has no potency among the fearless, the resolute, the desperate. It is operative only when men consider their chances, as of sudden death, against their devotion to the line of action, right or wrong, against which the force of arms may be directed.

Once perhaps the force of arms may have been really physical force. The power of muscle and of fists, may have brought some refractory family or tribe to order. Struggle is inherent whenever men are brought together. Nowhere do men in the large have like interests, like purposes, like feelings. But struggle is not force of arms, and the normal rivalries of men do not involve the necessity of killing. The power to kill without redress and the fear of killing are both involved in the force of arms.

And as military affairs progress we go further and further from the idea of force. Modern war takes no account of normal courage or personal strength. Torpedoes and lyddite recognize no heroes. The strong are led forth to slaughter, not as abler fighters, but as better able to bear the strain of camp or march, as looking better in a uniform.

The end of war is exhaustion on both sides. Not exhaustion of physical force, but of loans and taxes. When war decides, in

the last analysis, it is not force but fear which determines the solution. And fear was never the foundation of the stability of any nation.

If China, for example, should build up a great army, to promote internal stability, the effort would be sure to fail. A great army may hold communities in awe, it may fill the air with war, it may egg on the spirit of glory, it may inflame ambitions and antipathies. But no nation can build its institutions upon it. It is no factor in a great republic; it is no bond of union among self-respecting men. To found a nation upon force of arms is to build on sand. Even Germany's unity is not one of blood and iron. It rests on the wide-spread intelligence of the German schools, the well-planned training of her industrialism, the "wide-flung" justice of her code of laws.

"Dominion over palm and pine" avails nothing unless dominion has its real root in the hearts of a grateful people. The "wide-flung battle-line" can hold nothing worth keeping unless there grow up ties of common thought and common interest which in time will banish all need of lines of battle.

XVIII.

The Fighting Edge

What shall we say of the dangers we run by losing our "fighting edge"?

A military expert is reported to have declared at the Harvard Union: "When a nation becomes large and rich and inert it is certain of annihilation by other powers." Shades of the Goths and Vandals! When did all this happen? When did an inert nation become rich? When did a rich nation ever become inert? There is only one way. This was the Roman way: To become rich by plunder; to become inert by the loss of strong men, by the loss of the great widening wedge of those who should have been their descendants. This is the way of the armed host; and in history, each nation dependent on force of arms has found in it its final undoing.

Rome seized the fruits of other people's industry. Her strong young men were sent far and wide, over the accessible world, never to return. They left no offspring at home. Her leaders fought each other back and forth in Rome, until, in the words of the latest and best of her historians, "Only cowards remained, and from their brood alone came the new generations." The Romans conquered the world; and the Romans at home sprang from the man who was left,—from the man whom war could not use. The city of Rome filled up like an overflowing marsh, but her people were not true Romans. They were sons of slaves, scullions, peddlers, sutlers, adventurers, get-rich-quick men from the ends of the earth. To cultivate the Roman fields, the historian tells us, "whole tribes were taken." "Out of every hundred thousand strong men, eighty thousand were slain; out of every hundred thousand weaklings, ninety to ninety-five thousand were left to survive."

Even at the best, or the worst, Rome was not rich. It was only the few who controlled the plunder. It was only the Cæsars and the favorites of Cæsars who found place on the Palatine Hill.

For the mob there was no participation. Their part was bread and circuses.

No nation is really rich unless it grows rich evenly. No nation grows rich evenly save by industry and trade. No nation, rich or poor, ever grew inert through industry. The only exhaustion history has known is war exhaustion. This is expressed in terms of waste and debt: crushing taxes on the one hand, and reversed selection,—the survival, not of the fittest, but of the weakest. This shows itself in loss of initiative, in over-caution and undue patience in facing the ills of life, in corruption, in despotism, in dependence on violence instead of reason in meeting the national crises.

For all force of arms is a confession of weakness. It is a confession that the cause it represents is not founded in reason, in justice, not fixed in the hearts of the people.

"You cannot organize a pirate crew until its members drop the use of force one against another." The weapon of force "produces the very evils it was forged to prevent." The force of arms as a cementing influence is the badge of political inefficiency. The mailed fist is the dependence of the weak nations, not of the strong. Strong men are "too self-willed and too independent to allow any one to rule over them but themselves."

It was this thought that led Martin Luther to declare that no League of Princes could help on the German Reformation of religion. "God is a righteous but marvelous judge," he said. "Sickingen's fall is a verdict of the Lord that the force of arms must be kept far from matters of the Gospel."

There is no Orozco, nor Zapata, no Alva nor Tilly, no Goth nor Vandal nor Moor nor Hun who can over-run our nation so long as we thrive in the arts of peace. To be large and rich and courteous and reasonably honest is to make all other nations our friends and our debtors.

It is the business of a sentinel on the watch towers of the outer gate to keep us alert to every passing shade. It is the business of good citizens to keep their heads and to trust their neighbors so long as they know these to be good citizens too.

"The soldier is not to be blamed for doing his work. It is the

civilian who should be blamed for not adding the proper supplement." The citizen should size up the situation. It is his nation. He pays the bills. He suffers from the waste. If you live in a fire-proof house, no use to spend two-thirds your income on fire insurance. And don't depend on the insurance agent to set you right.

XIX.

The Net of the Usurer

What shall we say of the net of the usurer, which we are told stifles all activities of Europe in war or peace?

Men have been made free by war. Why not again? Why not break the net in which we are confined?

Because it will not break by war, for in war it was woven.

Mr. Cecil Chesterton (not the real Chesterton, whose name is Gilbert) first coined this phrase, the "Net of the Usurer," another name for the "Unseen Empire" of finance. With a mixture of metaphors worthy of a greater humorist, he looks to war to tear this usurer's net, because a costly war may rip the usurer's purse as well. That the banker may lose money does not ease up on the banker's creditors. For old wars, we have pawned our freedom; and war will not, on further borrowed money, restore it.

Mr. Chesterton would have France fight this war of release, and that against Germany (although the usurer mostly lives in France), the purpose being to save Europe from the infection of German ideas, especially "the idea that you can make a nation strong by making its people behave like cattle."

This idea may be a bad one, but it cannot be suppressed by killing Germans or being killed by them. It is itself purely a war idea, and more war will not cure it. Our nets were all woven by war, not by any usurer.

More war will only draw the net tighter. If we cannot find freedom in self-government, in peace, we cannot find it at all. The first step toward freedom is to get out of debt. Only thus can we "break the net of the usurer." How is this done? Not by more wars, more waste, more corruption, more military occupation,—with their legacy of more wars, more waste, and more corruption. By such means the net was spread in the first place. There is but one way to break it. It is by mending our own ways,

by moving away from the pitfalls over which the net was spread. It is by patience, frugality, limitation of governmental expenditures, the elimination of privilege, by the "humble and contrite heart" in public affairs, by preparing for peace and not for war, by stimulating science, education, sanitation and industry, by national justice, economy and solvency,—methods in national administration that would bring about the desired result in the affairs of the individual. The double standard in morals of the man and the nation—the idea that what is wrong for the man is right for the group—this has led only to evil. Equally evil is the double standard of economics, that what would bankrupt the man would cover the nation with glory.

If the system by which men and races are grouped in nations is to succeed,—and it is still on trial,—the administration of nations must follow the same laws of ethics and economics which control the actions of men. "My country, right or wrong," is a principle as dangerous as the braggart assertion of the "superman" that he will do whatever he pleases regardless of the laws of man or of God. There is no such right of man or nation. Whatever mistake either may make in matters of ethics or of economics, brings, in its degree, its sure penalty. And "the net of the usurer" is the prison in which nations which waste their people's substance, in whatever way, will find themselves presently confined. The road leads through insolvency and violence. The sole escape is to turn about and go the other way.

XX.

The Fertile Dreadnaught

What shall we say of the advocates for peace who stand at the same time for a great navy and corresponding military expenditures?

We shall say that we believe that they are mistaken. Without other reason we may not doubt their sincerity. But we may question their judgment. Nothing is more important than the maintenance of peace. But the show of force does not seem a good means to this end. Besides, it is most costly. If one-fourth of our present expenditures were more than adequate twenty years ago, half of the expenditures of to-day are on the wrong side of the account.

War instruments are built for war. Their influence tends toward its destined end. Those who make war are not appalled by them. Reckless daredevils, these warriors, they fear nothing; they have nothing to lose. It is the plain man who pays the cost. And cost multiplies cost. Once started on the line of war preparation and the expenses pile up with mathematical certainty and with no regard to real needs. Whatever movement has money behind it calls for more money. No nation has any system of checking expenditure. Debt breeds debt and waste breeds waste. That war expenditures are four times as great as twenty years ago implies no increase of danger anywhere. It means only that four times as many people are making a living by them. That the taxes of the world have doubled in fifteen years rests on the fact that twice as many people are tax-eaters.

It is a fine saying of Norman Angell, that "War is futile but not sterile." Most wars settle nothing, accomplish nothing; but each is descended from some other war, and each tends to become the parent of new conflicts. Just so with all schemes for expenditure. The dreadnaught is futile enough: no returns of good in any land can be traced back to it. But it is not sterile. It gives birth to new dreadnaughts, at home and abroad. English dreadnaughts breed German. German dreadnaughts are the parents of the American fleet. Our navy is the parent of the

growing fleets of Brazil, Argentina and Japan. Each avoidable expenditure calls for more expense. Even worthy expenditure has the same bad habit, as the number of persons interested in it expands. The wedge of the well-earned pension of the maimed soldier has opened the door of something for nothing for thousands of other soldiers, the gift culminating but not ending in the demoralizing service pension of to-day.

Forty years ago the Germans exacted from France the unheard of indemnity of a billion dollars. In fifty years, our southern states have paid about double that sum in pensions.

There is under consideration at Washington a bill which proposes to pay national money to the militia of the various states. The sums suggested range from $45 to $360 yearly for each individual. This is for service hitherto taken as an honor, a patriotic duty, or a healthy recreation. One of the evil effects of such a proposition (and all its effects appear to be evil) is this: that such expense breeds more expense. It is the beginning of an attempt to create a standing army, neither soldier nor civilian, its reason for existence being the money that is in it. As more and more persons become financially interested, the method of log-rolling will increase this largess from a few to many millions. It will go the way of the pension bills. What was originally a sacred duty of a grateful nation has become one of the scandals of the century. The money in it demands more money. It will be the same with the militia bill. Futile but not sterile are all our preparations for war in a time of trebly-assured peace.

War money makes war talk. War talk perverts public opinion. It increases the possibility of war, by making war seem easy and familiar, even inevitable. More war ships, more soldiers do not allay this. They mean more war money, more war talk, more expenditure.

The way to peace lies in the opposite direction. It lies in friendly relations and in friendly commerce, in the extension of international law, in the patient removal of possible stumbling blocks, the loyal ignoring of real differences if such exist, and making war never the first resort, but always the very last resort in every real crisis of the nation.

XXI.

The Dream of Invasion

What shall we say of those in search of fighting chances who still fix their eyes on Japan?

We who know Japan as a nation of patient, lovable people, intent on their own affairs, hopeful, sensitive, eager for the good will of their neighbors, burdened to the utmost with the cost of their experiences in Korea and Manchuria,—we can see no reality in their signs and portents.

We cannot conceive of a war between Japan and the United States. We would feel in such a condition the most intense humiliation; but we cannot imagine it as anywhere within the range of human possibility. If such a horror were to come to pass we should have to imagine the following series of incidents in our future history:

(1) The abandonment of our unchanged tradition of national friendliness toward Japan. Thus far, whatever may have been done or said by individuals, our Government has preserved for sixty years an unbroken attitude of courtesy and friendliness.

(2) That such breaches of this rule as might arise in Washington should be of such a character as to arouse an insatiable feeling of humiliation and an uncontrollable spirit of revenge on the part of the Japanese people. This spirit must be so strong as to overturn the patient and conservative ministry which desires and must desire, above almost all other things political, to retain the good will of the United States.

(3) That this supposed outbreak should take place before the American advisers in the Japanese Government could make their influence felt toward mutual understanding and before the friends of international decency in America could exert a similar influence.

(4) It would further be essential that the rulers of Japan should be determined on national suicide in the face of this assumed provocation. To send an armada to attack on her own ground 6,000 miles away a nation of twenty times her wealth and

practically out of debt, with a population half greater, would be self-destruction.

(5) It would involve further the necessity that the cause of war was so flagrant as to give Japan the sympathy of the civilized world, and especially of the world of finance. This sympathy must be deep enough to induce the bankers of London and Paris to give to Japan outright the $1,000,000,000, more or less, necessary to equip this armada and to carry on the war. They could not *lend* the money, for to Japan to-day, lending would be giving. Japan already owes more than $1,300,000,000, and to duplicate this debt would make her securities worthless. In Japanese affairs to-day almost every other interest is subordinated to that of keeping her credit good.

(6) The coast of Japan itself is no better defended than that of California. "It would be comparatively easy for an enemy of any strength to land" at Matsushima in order to overrun northern Japan, to land at unprotected Kamakura to flank and starve Tokyo, to land at Sakai to march on Osaka, and to isolate Kyoto. In fact, no nation with a long seacoast can ever raise money enough, no matter how grinding the taxation, to have every foot of it protected from invasion. On the other hand, no such invading army, in the heart of a hostile country, without a base of supplies, could ever finally escape.

(7) As the United States must be responsible for provocation, whatever that may be, why do we assume that she will act only on the defensive. Is not our monstrous naval expenditure based on the theory that we shall "meet the enemy in the middle of the sea"? I have assumed, of course, that provocation would necessarily be on the part of the United States. It is not conceivable that it should be otherwise. No other nation is so careless as to civilities, tho we have not often shown real insolence. Any one familiar with affairs in Japan must know that all her resources, and more, are devoted to holding on to what she now has. The occupation of Korea is a costly and perilous experiment, perhaps necessary as a defense against Russian aggression, but nevertheless involving the nation in many dangers which unexpanded Japan would have avoided. The lease of the railways of South Manchuria, with the city of Dairen and Port Arthur, further

greatly extends the danger line of Japan. The United States receives more than a third of the exports of Japan. Among nations with stable government she is Japan's nearest neighbor and most steadfast friend. Whatever the petty flurries on the Pacific Coast, the small rivalries of the European laborers with the rice field hands, the determination of the Japanese Government to cultivate friendship with us in every honorable way cannot be shaken.

If any great insurance company of the world ever underwrites against war, a policy covering our whole Pacific Coast could be had for half the present cost of maintaining the Presidio of Monterey. Men sometimes speak of the "dream of universal peace" as a most desirable but quite impossible ideality. But it is a reality so far as it goes, and it goes farther and farther every year. Almost any nation could attain it at once by substituting in part a civil tongue for its reliance on army and navy. The real obsession of the world is "the dream of universal war." This is the noxious dream of our times.

XXII.

The Defense of the Pacific

What shall we say to the demand on the part of army experts for the "establishment of three large mobile forces" for the defense of the Pacific Coast: one at Seattle, one at San Francisco, and one near Los Angeles? General Leonard Wood is quoted as saying at Berkeley recently: "We are prepared to cope with the situation so far as the bombardment of cities and towns is concerned, but we are not prepared to protect our people from the landing of a hostile force beyond the reach of our coast artillery. The seacoast defense is useless without a mobile army. Now, how are we to get men for this army? At present there are approximately 130,000 to 140,000 men in the various stations of the army service in the United States. We have need of 450,000 more. It is imperative that a reserve be established, as we wish to train the citizen to defend his country in case of war." [If this figure is correctly reported, some 50,000 of reserves or militia are included, besides the regular army of about 82,000 men.]

Elsewhere military experts have told us that if a large oriental army should without warning sail to our coasts, we should be helpless, without these three great forces. Must we take all this seriously? And must we stand the expense of all these military visions?

It is not stated how large these mobile forces ought to be. It is hard to fit figures to a warrior's dream. Ten thousand men in each of the ports is an easy figure on which to calculate. That means another twenty millions a year just for pay and board and keep. The great national University to which Washington gave his fortune more than a century ago, could be built for that. We could do wonders in storing and distributing our flood waters for an annual sum like that. And there are other expenses totaling no one knows what. The individual cost of a soldier averages a[1] out $600 a year,—more than double the cost in other

nations. But we do not begrudge this. We are willing that the boys should be well cared for. According to the *Army and Navy Journal* the total expense per man, for food, clothing and keep, is about $600 per year. "The authorized strength of the army is 81,500. The amount of their pay, including longevity pay, is $20,236,230. For clothing, subsistence and transportation the total is $16,047,080. Adding this to the pay, we have for our army a grand total of $36,283,140, which divided by 81,500 gives $445. Adding for what are known as 'overhead charges' gives us our $600 rate."

But for some unexplained reason, this cost is but one-fourth of our total army expenditures per year. Our people are ready, no doubt, to pay what is really necessary, but whatever is in excess of this is waste or graft. The total military cost for 1910-11 is given by Arthur W. Allen as $162,357,000. Dividing this by the number of soldiers (85,000) we have an annual cost of $1910 per year for each. Army preparations would be futile without soldiers. Yet it would appear that if the nation should discharge them all the saving would be relatively small. The balance of $113,457,000, besides interest, pensions and the time of those who might be employed in gainful occupations, represents still a huge military establishment, almost as large as the annual cost of the whole regular army of Great Britain ($138,800,000: 262,000 men), and as large as the combined army expenses ($122,709,000) of Austria ($73,513,000: 396,000 men) and Japan ($49,196,000: 225,000 men). Only in Great Britain, Russia, Germany and France is the army so costly as in the United States to-day, although all the principal nations have a larger fighting force. With us it is the establishment that costs, not the men.

What shall we say of the moral effect of these garrisons on our coast cities and of our coast cities upon them? However well disposed and well controlled, every idle garrison of idle men the world over is in its degree a standing menace to virtue, a standing target to vice. At the best a standing army should be a school, a school in which two or three years brings graduation, a school in military drill if it must be, but in industrial training as well, to fit its graduates for useful civil life. It should not be a life

profession for men debarred from marriage. The humble cottages of "Washerwoman's Row" disturb the neatness of our army posts, hence married soldiers are not wanted. But the choice remains—marriage or vice,—and vice goes with barracks the world over. Our own army officers and post surgeons have in late years done their best to alleviate these conditions, yet the tendencies remain still true. The secretary of war, with more emphasis than I have dared to use, speaks of our forty-nine army posts as "adjoined by dives and ill resorts of the vilest character." It is these conditions, he believes, "which make the record of the army in this respect shameful beyond that of the army of any other civilized nation." This actual supremacy we may doubt, for like conditions produce like results in every nation, whenever idle men are gathered together to wait for the action that may never come.

The purpose of this added force is to defend the Pacific Coast from an "enemy's attacks." We ask again, What enemy? It is plain that no such enemy exists. "The large oriental army" which shall slip away from Asia, running the gauntlet of hundreds of reporters, American and European, to land unsuspected at Monterey, could come from nowhere. There is no such possibility outside of the land of dreams.

A hundred thousand men is perhaps a "large army." This would require an Armada of more than fifty ships, sailing six thousand miles, to land on a very unwelcome coast.

The average yearly cost of the Japanese soldiers has been underestimated at $219 per year. Provisions come higher in California, and this supposed landing would exhaust a good deal of ammunition. But at the lowest estimate it would cost very many millions in cash to equip and start this army. It could not be done from funds in hand in any oriental nation. It could not be borrowed in London or Paris or New York, for every yen securable by the issue of bonds was exhausted in the war with Russia, for which Japan has $1,325,000,000 yet to pay. Japan has reached the limit of taxation. She can borrow no more. She would not fight us if she could. She could not fight us if she would. The United States still is, as she always has been, Japan's most steadfast friend and her best customer. Japan's outside

interests lie in Asia, all of them—in Korea and Manchuria—and her hold on these regions is absolutely conditioned on her friendship with the United States. The coast of Japan, for that matter, is far more vulnerable than our own. "A large army" could land almost anywhere in Japan. But, six thousand miles from its base of supplies, it could never get away again. No coast of any nation could ever be ideally and perfectly protected. There is always room for more men, more ships, more forts. If it were perfectly defended, the cost of protection, and the presence of these thousands on thousands of idle men would be a menace worse than an enemy's invasion.

"The Dream of Universal War" with which some of our military experts have become obsessed, has no foundation in any needs of the United States. It is a natural result, perhaps, of the existence of great armies and great navies maintained in idleness. The leaders of these armies and navies find in their dreams a world where soldiery is not play but action. We listen to them, and we open our treasuries at their behest because their art is one we do not understand. Everywhere the people's money is spent as money was never spent before on the "great illusion,"—that of ideal defense against imaginary dangers.

XXIII.

Pearl Harbor

What shall we say of Pearl Harbor, our new stronghold of the sea?

We have been told that Hawaii has dangers both within and without. As a coaling station it commands the Pacific. As a community it is commanded by Japan. There are nearly four Japanese to every Caucasian on the islands. This is no surprise, for the same relation existed when their white rulers turned these islands over to us. One military expert soberly declares that there are 35,000 Japanese ex-soldiers on the islands, each ready to rise at a signal from home. This we know is not true. There are not 35,000 ex-soldiers in Hawaii, nor any other number worth considering. If there were, it would signify nothing, as they have neither money nor arms nor officers, nor any understanding with the Japanese government. They are former rice-field hands, now laborers on the sugar plantations. The mutual relations of the many races in Hawaii are singularly amiable. Honolulu is the cross-roads of the greatest ocean. All races meet there in the most cosmopolitan of societies. Mutual knowledge breeds mutual respect. The ordinary police of the most peaceable of towns suffices for all internal defense of Honolulu. Moreover, whatever the census may show, the people are all, of choice, American: English, German, Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiians even. There is no doubt of that.

But what of the other menace from without? Do not oriental nations look with envious eyes on our Gibraltar of the Pacific? Surely, they need not worry us. What they might do if they could, is only a matter of conjecture. What they cannot do if they would is a matter of simple mathematics. Once in a century a nation can fight as Japan fought in Manchuria. That was the last time. Before the next century comes, the combined work of commerce, civilization and finance will put an end to international struggles. One impulse in the recent wars in

Europe has been the certainty that the close season for war is soon coming on. Surely our fortifications about Honolulu and Pearl Harbor would prove ample as defense were there anywhere an enemy.

Our secretary of war, the least exacting of our military experts, speaks of the great strategic importance of Pearl Harbor, of more value for "the protection of the entire Pacific coast from attack than any one of the positions on that coast now so strongly fortified. No naval enemy could make a serious effective attack upon any portion of the American Pacific Coast unless it had first reduced the position at Oahu, threatening its flank."

This is doubtless perfectly true; but vastly more important is the fact that there is no such enemy, and there can be none. The enemy's flank is already turned. It is turned by the crushing debt of past war and by the grinding residue of present taxation. It is turned by the friendship and justice of civilized nations, by the interrelations of business, by the great banker's hatred for war and waste. Magnificent as is the naval station at Pearl Harbor, impregnable as is its Gibraltar-like defense, these islands lie in the zone of peace. They are centres of no present struggles, no future outbreaks of ferocity. To the student of world affairs, their people of many races live in noble harmony, and an armed garrison is no more needed there than in Kokomo or Kalamazoo.

Japan has earned the right to be let alone, while she works out her own distressing problems of tax and debt and malemployment of men, all these with their necessary results in the rising cost of living.

When the writer was in Japan not long since, an editor came from Osaka to meet him at Nagoya to ask the cause of the rise in the cost of living in Osaka. Why is it that the farmer about the Inland Sea of Japan can no longer afford to eat the rice he raises, but must sell it to buy cheaper rice, meanwhile living on three-quarter rations? He cannot use his own crop, because he must sell it to pay his taxes, that his nation "may keep her place among the Great Powers of the World."

In the Japanese journal *Shin Nihon,* Mr. Nagai Ryutaro presents the case of these people; an "Appeal in behalf of those

unable to appeal": "Thousands upon thousands of our compatriots," says Ryutaro, "are on the verge of starvation. 'What little value is set on human life!' Mencius once asked King Yeh of Liang (China), 'Is there any difference between killing men by the sword and by means of government?' 'None,' replied the King. If future historians accuse modern statesmen of the slaughter of people by maladministration, what grounds will there be to deny the charge? I appeal on behalf of those who are unable to appeal!"

XXIV.

Magdalena Bay

What shall we say of the Magdalena Bay incident, a pure hoax at best, and of its treatment by the American press?

Here is the story as told in headlines of leading newspapers in New York:

JAPAN IN MEXICO STIRS SENATE. ULTIMATUM SENT TO MADERO. SENATOR LODGE ASKS PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION ON THE JAPANESE PLAN TO PUT A BIG COLONY ON MAGDALENA BAY. IN SECRET NOTE A YEAR AGO GREAT BRITAIN DEMANDED THAT U. S. STOP ACTIVITIES OF THE MIKADO'S GOVERNMENT.

Alarmed by the plan of Japan to obtain an official foothold along Magdalena Bay, where she will be a direct menace to the United States, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to-day introduced a resolution calling on the President for all information in the possession of the Government relating to the purchase of the land in that vicinity by the Japanese Goverment or by a Japanese Company. The resolution was adopted.

WARNING TO JAPAN ON MAGDALENA BAY. CABINET MEMBERS BELIEVE TAFT'S REPLY TO LODGE WILL END HER SCHEMINGS. STEAMSHIP LINE AS A CLOAK. POTENTIAL GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION NOW KNOWN. LAND LONG OWNED BY AMERICANS SOUGHT.

Japan's designs against U. S. to be revealed by inquiry under Lodge's resolution. Open charge of bad faith in acquiring foothold in Magdalena Bay based on information that Nippon government is backing the venture. Mikado is determined to test the Monroe doctrine in Mexico. Movements of Japs to Magdalena began immediately after Diaz cancelled arrangement with the U. S. for use of the place. Engineers recently prepared plans for a Japanese city.

Our old friend, the Japanese "War Scare," as a friend of adequate Naval increase. The *Herald* might be expected to be tempted to join the chorus of the "The War Scare" which is sure to be raised

over the reports that the Japanese have made arrangement with the Mexican Government for a naval base on Magdalena Bay, but as an enemy of sham and a promoter of good international relations it is compelled to say bluntly that the whole matter is an attenuated fraud, with its hair a little thinner and its beard a little whiter than when it made its last appearance, just a trifle more than a year ago. There is always some ulterior motive connected with the revival of this absurd report. Those who foster it seem to imagine that it might influence this country to intervene in Mexico. The theory is that unless the United States takes and annexes Mexico the Japanese will get such a foothold before the Panama Canal is opened that this country will have to fight the armies of Japan just across the Rio Grande. Not even a necessary evil. The last time this precious imposition was fostered by the interests that desired intervention, General Madero was leading a revolution against President Diaz. Then the Japanese naval base was to be in the Bay of Todos Santos, in Lower California. The yarn went clear around the world, and was scotched and killed by the *Herald,* which interviewed the most prominent statesmen of Japan. It was buried by President Taft on March 25th, concluding with the statement, "I am most happy to be able to reciprocate those assurances." It is not necessary to get up a Japanese "war scare" to show the country how its interests are being imperilled by the action of the house democrats in rejecting any battleships increase this year. The country knows that unless we have an adequate navy any dream of this sort that any coterie of adventurers might invent could come true.

New warning to the world and to Japan. President will restate our determination to enforce Monroe doctrine. Hands off the hemisphere. Taft's reply to the Lodge resolution will thwart Magdalena bay negotiations.

Magdalena bay quest in senate. President asked to tell what he knows of Japan's intentions. Lodge pushes inquiry. Recent reports have caused revival of coaling station story. Denials by Mexico. Information that a steamship company first seeks a foothold. Move thought a cloak. No advantage in the bay for commercial vessels, but ideal for warships.

Japs tried to buy Magdalena bay land of Yankees now holding it. American owners dickered with Orientals who wished to use fishing concessions, found colony of Japanese laborers, and form Japanese-American steamship line. President will say in his reply to senate resolution U. S. State department advised against sale. Proposed scheme in which Japanese government did not appear, fell through. This country could get land but doesn't want it, as Mexico won't cede sovereignty. The strip of land is five hundred miles long and sixteen wide.

Find evidence of Japan-Mexico deal. Commercial company seeks 2,000,000 acres on Magdalena Bay. Ideal coaling station. Site has little value except for naval purposes—Lodge resolution goes to State Department. Navy's head sees warning in issue. "This agitation over coaling stations and the Magdalena Bay affair would not excite so much apprehension if the prospects were good of keeping up a strong navy in the future."—George von L. Meyer, Secretary of the Navy.

Magdalena Bay story "merest buncombe," says chairman Sulzer of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. No foundation in fact. Taft's reply to the Lodge resolution will be reassuring in regard to our relations with Japan.

Japan's premier tells the *Times* there is no Magdalena bay incident. Fishing rights have been obtained by the Oriental Whaling Company of Japan. Far from Magdalena bay. Not in Lower California at all, but along 750 miles of the mainland. Others have same rights. Senators and members of house deeply impressed by the message. Call plot story exploded. Senator Lodge is gratified with statement that seems to explain. Marquis Saionji's statement to the *Times*.

The New York *Times* having invited Marquis Saionji, Prime Minister of Japan, to explain the reports that Japan was negotiating for a naval base at Magdalena Bay, in the Mexican territory of Lower California, Marquis Saionji cabled yesterday a reply to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, by whom it was delivered to the *Times*. Marquis Saionji says there have been no negotiations for Magdalena Bay, but the Oriental Whaling Company of Japan acquired fishing rights, in common with citizens and subjects of other countries, not at Magdalena Bay, but on the mainland of Mexico, along a strip of coast 750 miles long between the states of Tepic and Oaxaca.

This Magdalena Bay is a hamlet on the shore of the desert part of Lower California. Its roadstead is an excellent harbor, well suited, no doubt, for a coaling station if Mexico had any need of such stations. The land about it is worthless, the region being virtually rainless. Its empty sand dunes fit it well for target practice, although the shock of big guns has killed its shell-fish on the bottom. On one island is a village of one hundred people, clustered about a crab and turtle cannery owned in Los Angeles. The foreman of the cannery and five crab-catchers are Japanese. On another island is a brackish spring rising among the sand dunes, the only available water for scores of miles.

Government lands and everything else available for exploitation in Mexico has been parcelled out in concessions, these mostly held by foreigners. The fishing concession of Lower California is held by a Mexican resident of Los Angeles. Such capital as is associated with him in this concession is French. An option on the desert land concession about the Bay is held in the United States. No attempt has been made by the Japanese government, nor by any Japanese capitalist, syndicate or corporation to secure anything in Lower California. One Japanese gentleman without capital and representing nobody once went down to look at Magdalena Bay, and that is all. Other Japanese have examined the fishing concessions below Tepic and have abandoned the proposition as not worth while.

What shall we say of the newspapers? Only this, perhaps: our country has no monopoly of spurious news. Great London journals may pervert the truth with more dignity; great German journals may obscure it with more ponderosity; great French journals may twist it with more vivacity. But crooked journalism is crooked journalism the world over. There may be some choice as to methods, but not much as to motive or result.

XXV.

The Samoan Precedent

What shall we say of our operations in Nicaragua? No one seems to know. Our marines have fought bravely against somebody, and good men have lost their lives. The Department of State gives no clear explanation, but it is stated in the press that it finds a precedent in our intervention in German Samoa in the year 1899.

It may be remembered that the natives in Apia were "doing politics" rather warmly, but in their own fashion, when, without orders and on their own initiative, a British and an American warship in the harbor began to shell the town. The single American property owner on the beach, Mr. H. J. Moors, told me that he supposed that the ships were firing salutes until the shells fell about his hotel. He had asked for no intervention or protection. Afterwards marines were landed from both ships, and these, according to the record, "fought shoulder to shoulder against a savage foe." The "savage foe" was led by the genial and pious and, in his degree, scholarly Mata'afa. The machine gun of the invaders became "jammed," and some of the men were killed. One of the "savages" showed me the road the invaders took while Mata'afa's men were hidden in the "bush" along side. They could have killed all the marines except for the orders of their chief. Afterwards this matter of "armed intervention" was brought before the king of Sweden as arbitrator, and it was decreed that the United States and Great Britain are "responsible for the loss caused by their military action." The decision asserted the principle that a nation "has no right to land troops in order to preserve the property or the lives of her nationals." The United States agreed to pay the damages assessed, at the same time refusing to recognize the principle involved. In any event, probably this incident would serve better as a warning than as a precedent.

XXVI.

Japanese Immigration

What shall we say of Japanese Immigration? Only this: There is no problem now, and if we let well enough alone there will be no problem in the future.

Most of us in California hope to avoid a racial stratification of any sort among our people. Least of all do we want a body of laborers, Asiatic because they are underpaid and underpaid because they are Asiatic. Most of those in Japan who think upon the subject do not want the rice-field hands to go where they are not wanted, to go where their presence produces economic disturbances, or to go anywhere in such numbers that other people judge all their countrymen by them.

For all these reasons, representatives of the two nations met in 1907, on the "gentlemen's agreement," that no Japanese laborers should be granted passports for America, and that no legislation humiliating to Japan should be favorably considered at Washington. This "gentlemen's agreement" has been loyally and rigidly kept by the Japanese foreign office: too rigidly it may be, for even students from Japan bound for American universities, the best bond of peace between the two countries, find it increasingly hard to get their passports. The Japanese construe the word America in a broad sense, for since 1907 the emigration of laborers has been debarred from Canada and Mexico as well as from the Pacific states and from Hawaii.

Sometime in the long future our country may be wise enough to frame Immigration acts, which shall treat all nations of the world alike. This problem, most difficult at the best, cannot be settled off hand nor can it be settled now. Perhaps sometime we may see our way to admit skilled laborers only, from any region, and only when accompanied by their families. But no final adjustment is possible now; and all the Japanese ask for is to be spared the humiliation involved in any scheme for the exclusion of Asiatics as Asiatics. This is a matter of national sensitiveness

to a highly cultivated and sensitive people; and needlessly to hurt such a nation is to hurt ourselves. For the lines of commerce run in grooves of international friendliness. An indirect exclusion act, as of races not eligible for citizenship, is more humiliating than a direct act would be. It implies that the Japanese cannot read between the lines. Exclusion from citizenship, for which discrimination no adequate cause exists, is of the nature of insult in itself. To be shut out because they have been insulted once adds doubly to a humiliation they have no power to resent, but which they hope their nearest friend among the nations will not offer them.

If an exclusion act were necessary in our interest or our own protection, it might be a painful alternative. But there is no need for any action whatever.

Who is there who would wish to break the "gentlemen's agreement" in order to substitute an "exclusion act"? Not the laborers of California who fear Japanese competition, for such exclusion is now perfectly accomplished. To throw the matter again into international diplomacy would end in less perfect restriction than we have now. For restriction can be made most effective when the Japanese foreign office itself undertakes it. The people of the Pacific states, who fear lest they be overrun with Japanese laborers, have no need to ask for further legislation, for Japanese laborers cannot come while this "gentlemen's agreement" stands.

In the end if we keep up futile agitation, a disgusted nation will be likely to remove all barriers, letting West meet East whereever it will, each taking its own chances.

XXVII.

The Old-Age Pension

What shall we say of the Old-Age Pension as a wise charity of the State?

We shall go back to the fundamental principle of democracy. This is equality before the law. It is the elimination of privilege wherever found, of the rich or of the poor, all grants of something for nothing, all pay without an equivalent service. The function of the state is to provide first for justice,—that is equality before the law—the square deal among men and interests. Its next duty is to provide for all things needed by the people which must be in public rather than in private hands. Schools, armies, roads, inspection of banks, ships, corporations come under this head, as also conservation, sanitation, and many other things as yet imperfectly realized, which must come with time through the state; that is, through compulsory combined effort, because no other agency is possible.

But the state is only a plan of mutual assessment. It cannot be kind or charitable or paternal except at our own expense. It is just as cheap and more effective for us as citizens to be fraternal. To lean too heavily on the state means heavy assessments on its stockholders and too heavy taxes on its people, and by this means many states are perilously near bankruptcy. Or what is worse, as the incidence of taxation is easily shifted by wealth to be a burden on industry, a state reaches the condition when a few are very rich while the mass of its people are helpless.

The wealth of our own nation does not rest on its great sweep of prairies, its mines or its commerce. It rests primarily on the fact that "America means opportunity." Our nation has not always been true to the principles of its fathers, but it has not wholly forgotten them. Its free schools and its absence of privilege have made it possible for each of its children to make the most of the talents with which they are born.

Its people have not been crushed by taxation, by caste, nor

worn out by losing their strongest on the field of battle. The young men grow up to feel that "the world is their oyster," and it is for them and for them alone to find means to open it. The democracy of America has no masters save of its own creation, and the power that made these is adequate to set them aside.

The democracy of England has the handicap of ages of privilege. Inequality before the law is the foundation of British polity. England chooses lords and magnates and tyrants long before they are born. They belong to her system of privilege by which cities like Westminster, Sheffield, Devonport, Arundel, were held, virtually tax-free, by men whose ancestors received their land as royal gifts or bought them as cow-pastures. That the rich have special privileges, is the justification for special privilege to the poor, all privilege being granted at the expense of industry.

The "old-age pension" has been justly compared to the free pass homeward granted to the human wrecks who have lost their all in the gambling rooms of Monte Carlo. It is the shilling given to the man run over by my lord's automobile.

In a better system he would not have been run over. He would not have lost his money in a vile resort. He would not have needed an outside pittance to carry him through old age.

But the facts in England remain. The best of her workers have died in her wars, leaving a weaker stock to breed from. These have grown up unskilled, in default of the schools that make men strong. They have grown up in the atmosphere of the public house, sodden with lust and beer and whiskey. They have lost the opportunity that should be theirs, and at the end their fellows must be taxed to feed them. The tragedy of the East End of London is no normal part of the tragedy of Life. It is no part of the normal America. It is no part of a nation which has given opportunity. The flag of freedom never floated over a nation of deadheads, be they rich or poor.

But for us in a new country, fresh, unspoiled, full of life and hope, it is for us to hold our government to its rigid purpose, to develop opportunity by the elimination of privilege, to lean not on government but on ourselves, and to aid by fraternal giving those who have fallen in the press; not to weaken by unearned money those who are falling but who can be made to stand. The

way of the transgressor is hard and we would not make it easier if we could; we could not if we would. To give a man a chance to rise, is to allow him also the choice to fall.

"The old-age pension" is, so far as it goes, a confession of failure of democracy. Except as a measure of emergency, its real purpose in England, it has no justification in the public welfare. The old-age pension is part of the dark shadow cast over Europe by the growth of the gigantic delusion of "National Defense." Clean up the social atmosphere, restore to the people what is rightfully theirs, and they will care, rare accidents excepted, for their own old age.

XXVIII.

Taxing the Cost of Living

The rise in cost of articles of necessity began about 1897. It is world-wide, rather greater in high tariff countries, because of the shelter and leverage offered by protection. In general, this rise is about fifty per cent; the fall in the purchasing power of gold about the same. It is enhanced and aggravated in different countries by special conditions. Of these several have been described in the United States and others in other nations. These elements are not causes of the rising cost of living, but modifying circumstances. According to Sauerbeck, the "Englishman's dollar" of 1897 is now worth seventy-eight cents, the "American dollar" but seventy. Index tables of wholesale prices of many articles leave the American dollar of 1913 as worth sixty-one cents in the values of 1897. Of actual causes leading toward this change three may be recognized:

1. The great increase in the world's stock of gold (from about $7,500,000,000 to about $11,000,000,000). This increase has now passed its climax. As the amount of gold at the best is very small for the credit resting on it, the bonded war debt and municipal debt of civilized countries exceeding $60,000,000,000, it is believed that the importance of this factor is greatly exaggerated. Including bonds of private corporations, there are upwards of $150,000,000,000 in evidences of debt in circulation in Europe. It is, however, an element of unknown importance in determining the value of gold as stated in terms of other products of labor and capital. In so far as this goes, it is a cheapening of the actual value of gold.

2. The improvement of the processes by which gold is extracted and the consequent cheapening of gold as measured in terms of labor. The cyanide process has made it profitable to work low grade ores and old dumps, and a new dollar obtained from a gold mine costs in labor and capital much less than the old dollars cost.

Whatever value may be assigned to this factor, its influence is long since spent. It is not likely that the gold market will be soon disturbed again by new discoveries of mines or by new processes. So far as it goes, it means an actual cheapening of the value of gold.

3. The increase of taxation the world over, due to (1) the waste of actual war, (2) the extension of armies and navies, and (3) the increase by one hundred to two hundred per cent of municipal and other local indebtedness of the world. "Instead of living beyond our means, we are living beyond the means of the fourth generation." These extra taxes correspond to excise duties. They are laid more or less directly on the industries of the nations, and their effect is to increase the selling price of products. In so far as this influence goes it is not a cheapening of gold, but the pushing up, through taxation, of other values.

Roughly speaking, the taxes of the world have been doubled since 1897. Supported by these additional taxes, millions of men have been drawn from productive labor. In 1911 the bonded debt of the world for past expenditures (pawn checks for wars already fought) amounted to $37,000,000,000. The annual interest charges on this was over $1,400,000,000. The annual naval expense of the seven most "progressive"—that is, most wasteful—nations rose from about $250,000,000 in 1897 to $629,000,000 in 1911. The total military expenses of these same nations doubled in this time, with a correspnding withdrawal of men from industry to militarism. Meanwhile, municipal and other local debts everywhere are two or three times as great as in 1897. For example, San Francisco had in 1902 a budget of $6,500,000 annually. For 1913 this budget is $15,000,000. The valuation of city property was in 1902, $413,000,000. It is now $510,000,000. It is estimated that in 1921 the valuation will be $753,000,000, the tax $27,000,000.

The bonded debt of British cities rose from $1,500,000,000 in 1897 to $3,800,000,000 in 1912. A similar increase is seen in Germany and France. In the United States the total of state and local taxes has risen from $1,090,000,000 in 1901 to $2,505,000,000 in 1911. The fact that these sums are raised by indirect taxation makes the burden the greater. They must be paid in

the increased price of commodities,—in other words by a rising cost of living. All taxes, however levied, constitute a confiscation of private property for public purposes. A nation is a huge corporation which differs from other corporations in its power to levy assessments without limit on its bondholders. The dealer accustomed to a certain percentage of profit, adds his tax burden to this percentage. In doing so he must lower his purchase price or raise his selling price. What he does or can do depends on the relative power of resistance of producer, dealer and consumer. The stress and incidence of taxation falls on the less resistant elements. Any one of the three groups may combine to throw off this stress. The dealers are more often successful in this. As production is more or less limited, the consumer is the weakest of the three groups, and finally bears most of the burden. Some part of the consuming group being also producers may roll the burden back, but in any case an increase of taxation is a burden on the people, and they can only shift it among themselves. There is no foreigner they can plunder to make their losses good.

As each dollar must bear the tax burden, its value is diminished. Taxation lowers the purchasing power of money. As the purchasing power is likely to fall farther in the future, the rate of interest rises. Bonds will be paid at their maturity in still cheaper dollars. Hence the fall in value the world over of "gilt-edged bonds."

In this connection it may be noted that the price of most stable and staple commodities is fixed in London, the clearing house of the world trade. Our exports have, in general, in New York the London value minus the cost of handling. Imports have the London value with the addition of the cost of handling and the tax on imports. The value of non-exportable or perishable goods depends on local conditions, and is subject to much greater fluctuations. Thus potatoes are now very dear in California, and onions are excessively cheap. But this is a local matter of supply and demand.

I am a dealer, let us say, in Palo Alto. I allow a margin of fifteen per cent gross profit on my dealings. I have some taxable property and I feed my family. My taxes, direct and indirect, amount to $500. With time my government, municipal, state and

national taxes raise this tax to $1,200. I must increase my profits by $700. I allow a margin of twenty-five per cent on my transactions. Those from whom I buy have raised their margin also; they were obliged to do so to make both ends meet. I find that I cannot secure a margin of twenty-five per cent—my competitors cut under my prices. We lose money. Then we form a secret or private combination to hold up the Palo Alto prices. Our customers, largely professors, can not increase their stipends. They find that a salary of $4,000 in 1913 is equivalent to one of $2,500 to $2,800 in 1897. The cost of living has risen. The purchasing power of money has fallen. It has fallen mainly because all consumption has been over-taxed. The United States has done her part in this; but all over the world from Osaka to Manchester, Buenos Aires, Palo Alto and Irkutsk the same story is told with local variations. The suffering is greater on those nearest the bread-line. In my experience, I have found the pressure greatest in Italy and in Japan, and least in the United States, although in the United States perhaps most fuss is made about it. Steadily increasing taxation means steadily rising cost of living. The more you take away from the people the less they have left, and the higher the price they will set on what is left; and the more unpleasant it is to be poor, because the man lowest down is the man who can not set his own prices.

In this view, the primary factor in the rise of the cost of living is the fall in the purchasing power of gold, due to the excessive and growing exactions of the governments of the world. In other words, it is produced by the steady encroachments of the government on the individual the world over, through the Indirect Tax and the Deferred Payment, the two instruments of tyranny in the past, now used by democracy for self-oppression. Stated differently, the common man has too many mouths to feed, and it takes too much of his money to feed them. The cost of enforced idleness and malemployment, the special result of militarism, is greater even than the cost of powder, ships and guns. The long roll of those fed by tax increment steadily grows with the growth of the taxes that support them.

There is certainly a dangerous portent in a prosperity that rests on taxing the future, and in the steady inflation of values,

The debtor world is growing nominally rich at the expense of the creditor world, but a large part of its apparent wealth is due to the inflation of prices and these in turn to administrative waste, not to real additions in value. The financial management of the great nations has overleaped all checks and balances. With the financial management of even the best of the "progressive nations," no private corporation could escape insolvency. Leroy-Beaulieu has lately declared that the world has rarely before been so badly governed. Its financial affairs are "in the hands of incurable prodigals and improvident experimenters."

And the sign and evidence of this is in the steady rise in staple values, the steady increase in the cost of living.

Referring to the migration of people across the Rhine at Basle, from high-taxed Germany toward freer and more prosperous Switzerland, the so-called "Pilgrims of Hunger," Professor Paolo Goldini says that "In ten years we shall all be Pilgrims of Hunger."

XXIX.

Fort Graft

What shall we say of the defense of Los Angeles?

This fine city was until recently twenty miles from the sea, and being unfortified was immune from attack under the laws of war.

Reently, however, it has annexed to itself the seaport of San Pedro and the lots and farms between. Near San Pedro and dominating the harbor of Los Angeles is the fine large hill called the Palos Verdes. It is reported that this hill has been bought by the Government of the United States at a cost of, as stated, $249,000, not as a park, for which nature finely fitted it, but as a coast defense to be made, it is claimed, into a second Gibraltar. About $328,000 is now asked for as a beginning, and some $2,500,000 is expected to follow.

By this means Los Angeles will lose her war immunity,—which matters little, as there is not, never has been, and apparently can never be, an enemy on the outside which will do her any harm. For the same reason, this fortification will certainly be impregnable.

A leading general is quoted as saying, "Certainly Los Angeles Harbor must be fortified, but you folks out here must get behind it and shove. The money must come from Congress and it is your duty to see that Congress appreciates your need. . . . The situation is a live one, for wars are not over and never will be so long as men are men. . . . It is not a simple proposition of placing soldiers. The problem goes way back of that, and the people of the Coast must play the game."

It is suggested that the fortress be known as Fort Graft, in honor of its founder.

XXX.

The Navy and Statesmanship

What shall we say of our navy and its future, its purpose and its cost?

The American navy stands near the parting of the ways. Shall it continue the servant of a democratic people, or shall it develop into a special caste, unchecked as to expense, and with no responsibility save for war?

With the single exception of the British navy, the American navy is now the most costly on earth. It is one of the world's most expensive institutions. It costs more each year than all the colleges of engineering and agriculture of the world, with all the technical, industrial, and trade schools of whatever sort—foundations of the industrial prosperity of nations. It costs more each year than all the universities of the world—the foundations of all intellectual leadership and of social progress. Each year it reaches a higher level of expense, and for this there is no visible reason, either internal or external, save the local rivalries of Europe. The annual cost of our navy has risen from $56,000,000 a year in 1901 to $130,000,000 in 1912. In 1881 these expenses were but $13,000,000 per year.

The main duties of our navy in the future, as in the past, are likely to be away from the sphere of foreign war. We are outside the reckless rivalries of European Imperialism. The United States has known but three foreign wars. All three of these we have ourselves brought on, and in no case has history justified our action. While there may be crises ahead in our foreign relations, due to the greed of exploiters, or to the venality or recklessness of future diplomatists, no such danger is in sight today. No existing nation could do us any injury comparable to the injury to itself arising from the loss of our friendship and our trade.

That the United States should have a navy goes without saying. No one wishes to destroy the navy; we would only that

it should be our navy,—our contribution towards the international police, towards good order and safety on the sea.

We have been proud of the fact that our officers have been American citizens first, and afterwards, if need be, brave fighters; that they have never constituted a warrior caste, nor have they stood for war for war's sake. We have rejoiced that their training was that of first-class engineers and skillful navigators, with the culture of the Academy and the refinement gained by wide experience in travel. We have contrasted this with the warrior-caste of Europe, scornful of the common man and his interests, hand in glove with his exploiters, the great agent of imperial waste, and eager always for war—since war is their sole business and in war is glory and opportunity.

If the navy is to be the servant of the people, it must find the reasons for its acts and for its cost in the needs of the people. That two nations of Europe are running a neck-to-neck Marathon race, urged on, by war-scares and by class-interests, towards swift ruin by war or slow ruin by bankruptcy, is no reason why we should "speed up" to join them. We should rather use every influence towards "slowing the pace" and softening the friction. The insolvency impending is not that of lords, bankers, traders and war syndicates—those who thrive on the nation's waste. It is that of the common folk, who pay the taxes, and on whom the final weight of empire falls. The present condition in England and Germany is a world-wide calamity in itself. There is but one greater in sight: that is, that these nations should turn their armaments on each other. For each new dreadnaught increases the danger of collision. The crash would take place at any moment were it not for the restraints of bankers, of trade, of labor, and of civilization—which is another word for common decency. The cohesive force of intenationalism is very great, but it is strained as it has rarely been strained before; and the responsibility for the strain rests with the war-caste and war-syndicates of England and Germany.

The size of a navy is no index of a nation's power. A battleship is not an agent of peace. Like a revolver, it is built for killing. To say that "battleships are cheaper than battles" invites the epigram, equally true, that "revolvers are cheaper than tombstones."

What our navy should be is no question of naval strategy. It is a matter for the decision of the highest statesmanship. And since this is a civilian country, made up of civilian people, its statesmanship must be civilian statesmanship. Inside the navy, expert opinion ought to rule, probably to a greater extent than now; but the relation of the navy to other nations constitutes a matter mainly outside of the range of naval judgment.

By the present struggle for or against two dreadnaughts a year, or one or four dreadnaughts, we shall get nowhere. To continue or to add to our present unprecedented expense will sooner or later bring violent reaction. Extravagance and reaction are not good business.

We should not go on building great floating fortresses, because we have begun in that way, nor because England builds or Germany builds, nor because we may fall to third place or to tenth place in the rush if we do not build. We should do simply what is needful, wise, and just. Whatever is more than that is waste—and waste is the older name for graft.

The way to a solution of these matters lies, as I believe, in the constitution of a high commission of civilian statesmen to which the whole policy of army and navy development should be referred. This commission should be composed for the most part of men holding no political or military office.

Such a commission might outline the duties and needs of "national defense," and of national and international police service, so as to bring good citizens into agreement, and thus to lay the foundations for wise and stable policy.

I believe that we should build no more warships until our people can have such a statesman's survey of the situation. This should include consideration of the resources and purposes of our sister nations; the menace, if any, involved in these purposes; and the methods of removal of possible causes of friction without the suggestion of an appeal to arms. Wars do not come by accident, nor are they dispensations of an uncontrollable Providence. War is world sickness. It is brought on by human blundering, and it is quite as amenable to sanitation as any other form of human disorder.

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
A 000 086 263 1

University of California
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
305 De Neve Drive - Parking Lot 17 • Box 951388
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90095-1388
Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed.

Univ
Sc
L